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IDEOLOGY “ALL THE WAY DOWN”? 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF ESTABLISHMENT 
CLAUSE DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Gregory C. Sisk* 
Michael Heise** 
As part of our ongoing empirical examination of religious liberty decisions 
in the lower federal courts, we studied Establishment Clause rulings by 
federal court of appeals and district court judges from 1996 through 2005. 
The powerful role of political factors in Establishment Clause decisions 
appears undeniable and substantial, whether celebrated as the proper in-
tegration of political and moral reasoning into constitutional judging, 
shrugged off as mere realism about judges being motivated to promote 
their political attitudes, or deprecated as a troubling departure from the 
aspirational ideal of neutral and impartial judging. In the context of 
Church and State cases in federal court, it appears to be ideology much, if 
not all, of the way down. 
Alternative ideology variables of Party of Appointing President and Com-
mon Space Scores were highly significant and the magnitude of the effect 
on case outcomes was dramatic. Holding other variables constant, Demo-
cratic-appointed judges were predicted to uphold Establishment Clause 
challenges at a 57.3% rate, while the predicted probability of success fell 
to 25.4% before Republican-appointed judges. Thus, an Establishment 
Clause claimant’s chances for success were 2.25 times higher before a 
judge appointed by a Democratic president than before a judge appointed 
by a Republican president. Using Common Space Scores as a proxy for 
ideology, the most liberal judges were predicted to approve such claims at 
a 62.5% rate, compared with acceptance by the most conservative judges 
only 23.2% of the time. 
A religious–secular divide that has become associated with the two major 
political parties increasingly characterizes our national political discourse 
about the proper role of religion and religious values in public life. The fed-
eral courts may be sliding down into the same “God Gap” that has opened 
and widened between left and right and between Democrat and Republican 
in the political realm. Because of its notorious lack of clarity and a 
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consequently low level of law formality, the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause doctrine has become an attractive nuisance for political judging. 
Table of Contents 
Introduction .................................................................................... 1202 
 I. Results of Empirical Study of Establishment Clause 
Decisions in the Federal Courts, 1996–2005 ................. 1207 
A. Summary Description of Our Establishment Clause 
Decisions Study and Regression Results ......................... 1207 
B. Findings on Association of Variables on Establishment 
Clause Decisions ............................................................. 1214 
1. Party of Appointing President ................................... 1214 
2. Party of Appointing President and Appellate 
Panels (Panel Effects) ............................................... 1219 
3. Common Space Scores (Judge Ideology) ................. 1222 
4. Precedent, Case Type, and Other Variables ............... 1226 
 II. Why Have Political Differences Among Federal 
Judges Emerged So Powerfully in Establishment 
  Clause Cases? ...................................................................... 1229 
A. The Partisan Political Division in the United States 
on Matters of Church and State ....................................... 1231 
1. The Emergence of the “God Gap” Between 
Republicans and Democrats in National Politics ...... 1231 
2. The Percolation of the Partisan Divide on Church 
and State into Judicial Decisions .............................. 1238 
B. The Intolerable Subjectivity of Establishment 
Clause Doctrine ............................................................... 1244 
1. The Incoherence of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence ......................... 1246 
2. The Need for Higher Law Formality to 
Depoliticize Establishment Clause Adjudication ...... 1249 
3. Restoring the “Classic Legal Tug” in 
Establishment Clause Cases...................................... 1253 
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 1261 
Introduction 
When asked during her confirmation hearings whether hard cases must 
be decided by “what is in the judge’s heart,”1 Justice Elena Kagan insisted 
                                                                                                                      
 1. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2010) 
[hereinafter Kagan Nomination Hearing] (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary). 
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that adjudication by the Supreme Court of both constitutional and statutory 
cases is “law all the way down.”2 
In academic circles, this assertion was met mostly by cynicism about the 
candor of Justice Kagan’s answer or an attempt to reconstruct her answer to 
fit a nontraditional definition of what constitutes “law.”3 A few progressive 
law professors sought to rehabilitate the answer by shifting Justice Kagan’s 
plain citation of a conventional understanding of “law”4 toward an alterna-
tive conception of “law” that embraces political judgments about 
constitutional provisions that purportedly incorporate abstract moral princi-
ples.5 In so doing, one defender of Justice Kagan’s response hastened to 
dismiss as “ludicrous” any suggestion “that a judge can always decide 
what the law requires without calling on any moral or political convictions 
or any theory of social justice.”6 By contrast, more conservative academic 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Id. (statement of Elena Kagan, Solicitor Gen. of the United States).  
 3. See Eric J. Segall, Commentary, What Elena Kagan Could Have and Should Have 
Said (and Still Have Been Confirmed), 88 Wash. U. L. Rev. 535, 538 (2010) (arguing that 
Justice Kagan should have said that “the ‘law’ often runs out in difficult constitutional cases,” 
and therefore “a Justice has no choice but to bring her personal values, experiences, and 
judgments to the process”); Ann Althouse, The Kagan Hearings, Althouse (June 29, 2010, 
7:58 AM), http://althouse.blogspot.com/2010/06/kagan-hearings.html (“Kagan [was] forth-
right: ‘It’s law all the way down.’ . . . A good follow-up question would have been: But do you 
think that law includes a component that comes from deep values and human empathy? The 
secret answer is: Yes.”). But see Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 
26 J.L. & Pol. 123, 171 (2011) (arguing that even when the law leaves significant room for 
judges to reach conflicting conclusions in constitutional cases, judges are obliged to “shun[] 
reliance upon purely personal, non-legal reasons when making their discretionary judgments” 
and thus such “rulings are, in Justice Kagan’s words, ‘law all the way down’ ”). 
 4. See Kagan Nomination Hearing, supra note 1, at 173 (statement of Elena Kagan, 
Solicitor Gen. of the United States) (“[S]o to say that something is law all the way down, 
which is absolutely the case, [is to say] that it would be completely improper for a judge to 
import personal, or moral, or political preferences into the occasion.”); see also Keith J. 
Bybee, Will the Real Elena Kagan Please Stand Up? Conflicting Public Images in the Su-
preme Court Confirmation Process, 1 Wake Forest J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 137, 147 (2011) 
(“[Leading newspapers covering the nomination] clearly conveyed the impression that judicial 
decision making is a matter of impartial principle, and did so primarily by reporting the words 
of Kagan herself.”); Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s 
Cult of Celebrity, 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1255, 1255 (2010) (“Nominees of both parties now 
present themselves as modest and humble servants of the law, respectful of existing precedent 
and without a desire to move the law in any particular direction.”). 
 5. Ronald Dworkin, The Temptation of Elena Kagan, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 19, 
2010, at 35, 36 (arguing that it is “ ‘law all the way down,’ ” but because some constitutional 
clauses are drafted in “abstract moral language,” discovering and applying the law requires “a 
judge [to] rely on moral conviction”); see also Posting of Mark Tushnet, William Nelson 
Crowell Professor of Law, Harvard Law Sch., to conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu (June 29, 2010), 
http://www.mail-archive.com/conlawprof@lists.ucla.edu/msg20140.html (“[O]f course judg-
ing is law all the way down. . . . Of course that doesn't mean that it's not, to take two 
possibilities, politics and empathy all the way down as well—which is why the answer, while 
accurate, isn’t all that informative.”). 
 6. Dworkin, supra note 5, at 35; see also Lerner & Lund, supra note 4, at 1256–57 
(“In the legal academy, this traditional ideal [of judging] is considered laughable at best and 
pernicious at worst.”). 
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commentators, though attracted to a traditional focus on “law” as the es-
sence of judging, remained skeptical that Justice Kagan’s stated 
commitment to nonpolitical and restrained judging was authentic and accu-
rately predicted her future judicial behavior.7 
Based on our recently completed empirical study of Establishment 
Clause decisions in the lower federal courts, skepticism about the ability of 
judges to separate political preconceptions from judicial declarations in a 
high-visibility area with low-rule formality may be warranted. Whether cel-
ebrated as a proper integration of political and moral reasoning into 
constitutional judging, shrugged off as mere realism about judges being mo-
tivated to promote their political attitudes, or deprecated as a troubling 
departure from the aspirational ideal of neutral and impartial judging, the 
powerful role of political factors in Establishment Clause decisions appears 
undeniable and substantial. In the context of federal court claims implicating 
questions of Church and State, it appears to be ideology much, if not all, of 
the way down.  
As part of our ongoing empirical examination of religious liberty deci-
sions in the lower federal courts,8 we study here all digested Establishment 
Clause decisions by federal court of appeals and district court judges from 
1996 through 2005.9 Not only were our alternative ideology variables of 
Party of Appointing President and Common Space Scores highly significant 
(at the p < .001 level), but the magnitude of the effect on case outcomes was 
dramatic. 10  Holding all other variables constant, Democratic-appointed 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See Jonathan Alder, The Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, Response to 
Topic A, Wash. Post (June 29, 2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/AR2010062902652.html (“[L]ike successful nominees before 
her, [Kagan] erred on the side of caution, not candor. . . .”); Rick Esenberg, No Need 
to Pretend—She’s a Liberal, Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, July 3, 2010, http:// 
www.jsonline.com/news/opinion/97700799.html (arguing that Justice Kagan’s background 
and previous statements suggest that she accepts the liberal view that “judicial discretion is 
broad” and will “tend to use that discretion to privilege those values emphasized by contempo-
rary progressives”).  
 8. See Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: 
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts (2011) (working paper); Michael Heise & Grego-
ry C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Perspective, U. 
Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Heise & Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial 
Decisionmaking]; Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the 
Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1021 (2005) 
[hereinafter Sisk, Traditional and Minority Religions in the Courts]; Gregory C. Sisk & Mi-
chael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 
99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 743 (2005) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology]; Gregory C. 
Sisk & Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence 
from the Federal Courts (U. of St. Thomas Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 11-23, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917057 [hereinafter Sisk & 
Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty]; Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, 
Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom 
Decisions, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 491 (2004). 
 9. See infra Section I.A. 
 10. See infra Sections I.B.1 and I.B.3. 
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judges were predicted to uphold claims challenging government conduct on 
Establishment Clause grounds at a 57.3% rate, while the predicted probabil-
ity of success fell to 25.4% before Republican-appointed judges. Thus, an 
Establishment Clause claimant’s chances for success were 2.25 times higher 
before a judge appointed by a Democratic president than one appointed by a 
Republican president. Using Common Space Scores as a proxy for ideology, 
the more liberal judges were predicted to approve such claims at a 62.5% 
rate, compared with acceptance by the more conservative judges only 23.2% 
of the time. 
No other variable—not the judges’ prior legal positions, religion, race, 
or gender—proved consistently salient in predicting the outcome of claims 
alleging that governmental conduct crossed the supposed line “separating 
Church and State” under the Establishment Clause. The statistical signifi-
cance of a variable measuring precedent (specifically, the reaction of the 
lower federal courts to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Agostini v. 
Felton11) reassures us that legal guideposts have continuing force, even 
when the otherwise malleable doctrine leaves considerable space for extra-
legal influences on judging.12 Nonetheless, the independent significance and 
substantial size effect of alternative party and ideology-score variables re-
main striking. 
In this particular but leading field of constitutional adjudication, our na-
tion’s judges appear to have separated into the same camps as the national 
political parties. Since the 1970s, the Democratic Party has become progres-
sively more secular or disassociated from traditional religion and more 
strongly associated with a separationist approach toward religion and gov-
ernment.13 During the same period, the Republican Party has attracted 
growing support from persons with high levels of religious activity and has 
advocated an accommodationist stance toward religion and religious institu-
tions’ interactions with and influence on government and public policy. 
Whether categorized as Democrat-versus-Republican or framed as liberal-
versus-conservative, a religious–secular divide increasingly characterizes 
our national political discourse—and perhaps judicial deliberations as 
well—about the proper role of religion and religious values in public life. 
Sometimes a singular episode speaks volumes about the general attitude 
held within a political–legal movement. Confirmed in the only signed draft 
of the speech that is now preserved at the White House, and reported con-
temporaneously by those who were present when it was delivered, Abraham 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address expressed the fervent hope that a “new birth 
of freedom” following the Civil War would be realized by “this nation, un-
der God.”14 But when printing thousands of pamphlets containing leading 
constitutional documents, the liberal American Constitution Society opted to 
                                                                                                                      
 11. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 12. See infra Sections I.B.4 and II.B.3. 
 13. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 14. Robert George, God and Gettysburg, First Things, Aug./Sept. 2010, available 
at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2010/07/god-and-gettysburg. 
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circulate an earlier, undelivered draft of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address which 
omitted the words “under God.” This peculiar choice of an alternative text is 
difficult to understand as anything other than the deliberate sanitizing from 
the speech of a prominent religious reference.15 
On the other end of the political–legal spectrum, one elected state judge 
became passionately devoted, above all else, to enshrining a religious sym-
bol in a courthouse. When he rose to head of the state judiciary, he lashed 
the wheel of the state court system to steer unerringly toward that end, heed-
less of the shoals of contrary higher court rulings, and ultimately ran his 
own judicial career aground. After this previously “obscure Alabama trial 
judge” seized national attention for posting the Ten Commandments and 
leading Christian prayers in his courtroom, he “rode the wave of publicity to 
election as chief justice of the Alabama Supreme Court.”16 
Having campaigned as the “Ten Commandments Judge,”17 Chief Justice 
Roy Moore installed a two-and-a-half-ton stone monument of the Ten 
Commandments at the center of the Alabama courthouse rotunda.18 He de-
fended his display, not merely by reference to the historical importance of 
the Ten Commandments in American society, but by emphasizing that the 
monument represented “the revealed law of God.”19 When ordered by a fed-
eral court of appeals to remove the monument, Chief Justice Moore 
pointedly refused, which led to his removal from office by the state judicial 
ethics panel.20 
Most thoughtful commentators on the left neither doubt nor denigrate 
the powerful and appropriate influence of religion on public policy, on mat-
ters ranging from the civil rights movement to environmental protection. 
And few if any conservative thinkers countenance imposing theological doc-
trines into public policy, although they value the teachings of religious 
traditions on public matters of morality and culture. Nonetheless, despite 
what may be substantial agreement among most Americans on general prin-
ciples, we have seen an increasing tendency in national politics toward 
secular egalitarianism on the left and overt religious coalition-building on 
                                                                                                                      
 15. But see Caroline Frederickson, Debate or Distraction: Why Some Are Fretting 
Over the ACS Pocket Constitution, Am. Constitution Soc’y for Law & Pol’y (July 20, 
2010), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/debate-or-distraction-why-some-are-fretting-over-the-
acs-pocket-constitution (rejecting “the claim that ACS deliberately manipulated the texts out 
of an alleged anti-God agenda of our organization” and observing that the first document in-
cluded in the pamphlet, the Declaration of Independence, makes “very clear references to God 
and ‘the Creator’ ”). 
 16. Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L. & 
Religion 187, 231–32 (2001). 
 17. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003), subsequent determina-
tion, 347 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 18. Id. at 1284. 
 19. Id. For an exploration of this episode in terms of both conscience and prudence, see 
Robert K. Vischer, Professional Identity and the Contours of Prudence, 4 U. St. Thomas L.J. 
46, 48–51 (2006). 
 20. In re Moore, No. 33 (Ala. Ct. Jud. Nov. 13, 2003). 
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the right.21 While one side of the political spectrum at times appears intent 
on removing all religious influences and even religious references from 
public life,22 the other side sometimes appears eager to inject religious 
connotations into even the most prosaic of political squabbles.23 
In a more judicious manner, but no less real and substantial in effect as 
revealed in our empirical study, the federal courts may be sliding down 
into the same “God Gap” that has opened and widened between left and 
right in the political realm. In our study, we have identified a subject of 
adjudication in which the “classic legal tug”24 against personal judicial 
preferences or attitudes has failed to take firm hold. Because of the notori-
ous lack of clarity in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and a consequently low level of law formality, the door to 
unrestrained political judging has been thrown wide open.25 With these 
untoward consequences, the subjectivity of Establishment Clause doctrine 
has passed the point of tolerability. 
I. Results of Empirical Study of Establishment Clause 
Decisions in the Federal Courts, 1996–2005 
A. Summary Description of Our Establishment Clause Decisions 
Study and Regression Results 
In this study, we conducted an analysis of decisions made by both feder-
al courts of appeals and federal district courts in cases raising constitutional 
religious freedom issues.26 For this phase of the study, we created a data 
set of all digested decisions by federal district courts and courts of appeals 
                                                                                                                      
 21. See Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church-State Problem—
and What We Should Do About It 235 (2005) (“We are, increasingly, a nation divided by 
God. Although we all believe in religious liberty and almost no one wants an officially estab-
lished religion, we cannot agree on what the relation between religion and government should 
be.”). 
 22. See Richard Rorty, Religion as Conversation-stopper, 3 Common Knowledge 1 
(1994), reprinted in Philosophy and Social Hope 168, 169 (1999) (arguing that it should be 
seen as “bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public policy”). 
 23. See Andrea Stone, Congress Latest Battlefield in Annual “War on Christmas” 
Debate, AOL News (Dec. 16, 2010, 9:30 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/12/16/congress 
-latest-battlefield-in-annual-war-on-christmas-debate (discussing assertions by Senate Repub-
lican leaders that plans for Congress to work through the holiday season were “sacrilegious” 
and “disrespect[ful of] one of the two holiest of holidays for Christians” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 24. See Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 200 
(2007) (referring to the “classic legal tug” on procedural issues that overrides ideological 
preferences). 
 25. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 26. Our data set, regression-run results, coding of each decision, coding of each judge, 
and coding information may be found at Gregory Sisk & Michael Heise, Empirical Study of 
Religious Liberty Decisions Study Data, U. St. Thomas (last visited Jan. 20, 2012), http:// 
courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html. 
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resolving an Establishment Clause challenge to governmental conduct from 
1996 through 2005.27 As the decisions were collected, the direction of each 
judge’s ruling, the general factual category of the case, the religious affilia-
tion of the judge, the religious demographics of the judge’s community, the 
judge’s ideology, the judge’s race and gender, and various background and 
employment variables for the judge were coded.28 
As the point of analysis, we examined each judge’s ruling in an 
individual case as a “judicial participation.”29 Each district court judge’s 
ruling was coded separately, as was each vote by one of the multiple 
judges participating on an appellate panel. Accordingly, the primary focus 
of our study was the judge rather than the court as an institution or a 
collective appellate panel30—that is, we measured the individual response 
of each judge to each Establishment Clause claim. 
Our decision to include district court judges along with court of appeals 
judges in this study, and to code both types of judges in the same way on 
merits decisions, warrants explanation. Scholars are conducting important, 
cutting-edge research on the district courts through quantitative study of 
dockets, developments, and rulings at multiple stages of the civil litigation 
process.31 Because typically “the nature of district court judges’ work is 
substantially different from that of appellate judges,” these scholars tailor 
their empirical research to the distinct institutional setting of the district 
court.32 While admiring this important and ongoing work, we determined, 
                                                                                                                      
 27. In our prior study of 1986–1995 religious liberty decisions, we included only pub-
lished decisions in our data set. Sisk, Traditional and Minority Religions in the Courts, supra note 
8, at 1028, 1034. In so doing, we knowingly “biased our database in favor of decisions that raise 
highly visible, controversial, landmark, or difficult questions of religious freedom, or at least issues of 
religious freedom that a judicial actor found particularly interesting and thus worthy of publication.” 
Id. at 1049. For this 1996–2005 study, we have expanded the data set to include the set of unpublished 
but digested opinions available on Westlaw. In addition to 535 judicial participations from published 
decisions, our data set includes twenty judge votes from decisions that were digested by Westlaw but 
not published in the reporter system. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 26. 
 28. Every decision was independently coded by both a trained law student and one of 
the authors. For more detailed information about our study, data collection, and coding, see 
the description published as part of our prior study of religious liberty decisions from 1986 to 
1995, Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 530–54, 571–612. The few changes in the selec-
tion of variables and coding from the prior study may be found by reviewing our coding and 
coding information. See supra note 26. 
 29. For further discussion of judicial participations as the data point, see Sisk, Heise & 
Morriss, supra note 8, at 539–41. 
 30. We did, however, control for the Party of Appointing President of the other judges 
on a three-judge appellate panel in alternative regression runs, thus conducting a limited ex-
ploration of panel effects. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 31. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited Liability, 104 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 853 (2010); Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge Deci-
sion-Making?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 83 (2009); James D. Cox et al., There Are Plaintiffs 
and . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 
Vand. L. Rev. 355 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 223 (2008). 
 32. Kim et al., supra note 31, at 85. 
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for two reasons, that a separate district court-focused and docket-oriented 
approach was neither possible nor well suited for this particular study of 
religious liberty rulings. 
First, our study examines religious liberty decisions from 1996 to 2005, 
while the various federal docket and pleading databases are generally relia-
ble only from 2000.33 The restricted search options and limited nature of 
case coding in the federal court docket databases, none of which allowed 
general searches for all cases raising religious liberty issues, further pre-
cluded our effective use of these sources for our study.34 Accordingly, we 
placed trial court rulings in the same decisional space as appellate court 
rulings, requiring us to focus on merits rulings and not preliminary non-
merits rulings and to include all digested opinions available on Westlaw, 
whether or not the opinions had been published in the reporter system. 
Second, and more importantly, in the special context of constitutional 
rulings, the deferential standard of appellate review that ordinarily is applied 
to a trial court’s factual findings is subject to the “constitutional fact” excep-
tion for “factual” disputes that go to the core of a constitutional question.35 
Trial and appellate judges share parallel responsibilities for resolving a con-
stitutional case, including the central constitutional significance of factual 
assertions, precisely “to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury 
from having far-reaching legal effects.”36 Accordingly, we concluded that 
expanding our empirical study beyond circuit judges to evaluate the behav-
ior of a larger and more inclusive set of lower federal judges has much 
merit, especially in the context of constitutional rulings. 
Nonetheless, we conducted alternative regression runs to tease out dif-
ferences in the behavior of district court and court of appeals judges in 
Establishment Clause cases. A dummy variable for appellate court deci-
sions was highly significant at nearly the .01 level (or 99% probability 
level) in a negative direction, meaning that appellate rulings were less 
likely to generate favorable Establishment Clause rulings than were trial 
                                                                                                                      
 33. Boyd & Hoffman, supra note 31, at 877 n.119, 880. 
 34. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis of 
Beliefs About the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better Data About Law, 
14 J.L. & Pol’y 137, 144–45 (2006) (observing that cases are coded in the federal docket 
database PACER for a single type, even if the case involves multiple causes of action); Mary 
Whisner, Unanswerable Questions, 100 Law Libr. J. 581, 583 (2008) (noting that the “Nature 
of Suit” coding in PACER lacks the detail needed for finding many types of cases). 
 35. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 n.8 (1987) (responding to the 
dissent’s objection that the majority “failed to accord adequate deference to the purported 
‘findings’ ” of the trial court by explaining that “any factual findings subsumed in [a constitu-
tional] determination are subject to constitutional fact review” by the appellate court). See 
generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229 (1985). 
 36. A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th 
Cir. 2002) (“That admixture of fact and law, sometimes called an issue of ‘constitutional fact,’ 
is reviewed without deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury 
from having far-reaching legal effects.”); see also Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, 541 F.3d 
1017, 1029 (10th Cir. 2008) (conducting de novo review of district court’s findings on each 
part of test for Establishment Clause) 
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court rulings. Holding all other independent variables constant, a court of 
appeals judge was predicted to rule favorably in an Establishment Clause 
case at a rate of 34.4%, as compared to 50.0% for district court judges. 
However, the addition of this control variable for appellate rulings did not 
alter the significance of any other finding. In addition, we conducted sepa-
rate regression analyses of district court and court of appeals rulings; we 
found few substantive differences, and those that are meaningful are dis-
cussed at pertinent points in this Article. 
We also acknowledge that several studies have found only a small per-
centage of district court dispositions to be accompanied by a written 
opinion,37 which is the data point for our study. For the high-visibility area 
of Establishment Clause challenges to government interaction with religion, 
we have reason to believe that the percentage of district court dispositions 
with written, even published, decisions is much higher. In a spot check of 
100 Establishment Clause complaints produced in a search of the Westlaw 
Pleadings database, we found that nearly three-quarters of the cases did lead 
to written decisions, most of which were also published. Even so, our search 
process undoubtedly captured a larger share of the universe of Establish-
ment Clause dispositions in the courts of appeals than in the district courts. 
Accordingly, the reader might fairly place greater weight on our findings 
with respect to the courts of appeals than with respect to the district courts. 
To be coded as a decision on the merits, a ruling by a district court 
judge must have accepted or rejected a particular claim in a manner that 
engaged the merits of the claim, even if the ruling issued by the judge was 
not a final judgment. Nonmerits justiciability or procedural rulings, how-
ever, were excluded.38 For court of appeals decisions, a ruling was coded 
as being on the merits if it affirmed or reversed a final judgment by a dis-
trict court on an Establishment Clause claim or if it remanded the case 
after evaluating a significant element of the merits of the claim.39 If a three-
judge appellate panel issued a decision that later was reheard en banc (or 
became the subject of a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc), each 
judge was recorded as having cast only one judicial vote, even if a judge 
participated on both the three-judge panel and the en banc panel (or the dis-
sent from the denial of rehearing).40 
                                                                                                                      
 37. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 
Wash. U. L. Rev. 681, 710 (2007) (finding that 3% of cases in 4 district courts resulted in 
written decisions); Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published 
Cases: A Research Note, 15 Just. Sys. J. 782, 789–90 (1992) (finding that only 5.3% of cases 
brought before a Minnesota district court received published opinions, though the percentage 
varied by the type of claim); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for 
Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC 
L. Rev. 155, 165 (2006) (finding that 8.7% of district court dispositions were accompanied by 
a written opinion while only 2.3% of district court dispositions were published).  
 38. See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 546 (defining a “merits” ruling). 
 39. See id. at 547–48. 
 40. See id. at 552–53. 
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The dependent variable was the individual judge’s vote in each case, cod-
ed as “1” when the Establishment Clause claim was upheld and “0” when it 
was rejected. (Thus, positive coefficients correlate with approval of the claim 
and negative coefficients with rejection of the claim.) Because we analyzed 
the influences of multiple variables, we adopted multiple regression models. 
Because the dependent variable was dichotomous, we applied logistic regres-
sion.41 Our two primary models (using different proxies for ideology) were 
nearly identical in the percentage of the overall variation explained and 
were largely parallel in statistically significant variable correlations. 
Our Establishment Clause data set consisted of 555 judicial participa-
tions drawn from 238 decisions (133 district court decisions and 105 court 
of appeals decisions).  The Establishment Clause claim was favorably re-
ceived by the ruling judge 39.8 percent of the time.42 
Table 1. 
Regression Analysis for Establishment Clause Judicial 
Participations, Federal Courts (1996–2005) 
 
Party of
Appointing 
President 
Model 
Common 
Space Score 
Model 
Case Type: 
Private Education 1.493*** 
(0.396) 
 
1.429***   
(0.384) 
Public Education—Elementary 0.679 
(0.498) 
0.639  
(0.521) 
 
Public Education—Secondary/ 
Higher 
1.150* 
(0.461) 
1.164* 
(0.456) 
 
Religious Meetings 1.161** 
(0.405) 
 
1.126** 
(0.392) 
Religious Symbols 1.202** 
(0.388) 
1.169** 
(0.419) 
Judge Religion: 
Catholic 
-0.073 
(0.240) 
 
-0.053  
(0.236) 
Baptist 0.146 
(0.556) 
0.099  
(0.568) 
 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Id. at 553. 
 42. In our prior study of lower federal court decisions from 1986 to 1995, claimants 
were successful in 42.3 percent of the judicial observations. Id. at 571. 
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Party of
Appointing 
President 
Model 
Common 
Space Score 
Model 
Other Christian 0.181 
(0.460) 
 
0.130  
(0.507) 
Jewish 0.461 
(0.421) 
 
0.463  
(0.474) 
Other 
-0.272 
(0.525) 
 
-0.337  
(0.490) 
None 0.190 
(0.224) 
0.220  
(0.261) 
Judge Sex and Race: 
Sex (Female) 
-0.337 
(0.335) 
 
-0.186  
(0.280) 
African-American 
-0.039 
(0.304) 
 
0.093 
(0.316) 
Asian or Latino 
-0.369 
(0.515) 
-0.145  
(0.557) 
Judge Ideology or Attitude: 
Party of Appointing President 
-1.370*** 
(0.401) 
— 
Common Space Score 
 
Other Judge Characteristics: 
— -1.541***  
(0.479) 
 
ABA Rating—Above Qualified 
-0.129 
(0.156) 
 
-0.097  
(0.186) 
ABA Rating—Below Qualified 
-0.193 
(0.231) 
 
-0.242  
(0.236) 
Seniority on Federal Bench 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
 
-0.000  
(0.001) 
Elite Law School 
-0.142 
(0.222) 
-0.083  
(0.174) 
Judge Employment Background: 
Military 
-0.101 
(0.320) 
 
-0.090 
 (0.310) 
Government 
-0.094 
(0.284) 
-0.108   
(0.266) 
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Party of
Appointing 
President 
Model 
Common 
Space Score 
Model 
 
State or Local Judge 0.267 
(0.212) 
 
0.249  
(0.206) 
Law Professor 0.171 
(0.355) 
0.163  
(0.360) 
Community Demographics: 
Catholic Percentage 0.024** 
(0.009) 
 
0.016  
(0.009) 
Jewish Percentage 
-0.030 
(0.027) 
 
-0.029  
(0.029) 
Adherence Rate 0.007 
(0.016) 
0.008  
(0.015) 
Precedent Variables:   
Agostini 
-0.704* 
(0.330) 
 
-0.579 
(0.309) 
Zelman 0.049 
(0.621) 
 
0.030  
(0.607) 
Year of Decision 0.005 
(0.089) 
 
-0.001 
(0.084) 
(constant) 
-11.396 
(177.872) 
 
1.306  
(166.726) 
pseudo R2 0.119 0.107 
percent explained 69.01 68.83 
N 555 555 
Note: Establishment Clause Outcome = 1. Standard error adjusted for twelve 
clusters in circuits.43 
* p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001. 
                                                                                                                      
 43. In clustering standard errors at the circuit level, we aimed to account for the effect 
of circuit precedent and, indirectly, regional variation. Alternatively, we also conducted a re-
gression analysis that clustered standard errors at the judge level (given that several judges 
produced more than one judicial participation in our study). Finding no substantive differ-
ences, we do not separately report that regression table. 
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B. Findings on Association of Variables on Establishment Clause Decisions  
1. Party of Appointing President 
Researchers applying quantitative methods to the study of the federal 
courts long have sought to capture ideological or political influences on atti-
tudes of judicial actors. For decades, the standard political measure for 
federal judges was the political party of the president that had appointed the 
judge to the bench.44 In the past decade, an alternative proxy for judicial 
preferences has taken hold in the political science discipline, which involves 
assignment to each judge of a “common space” ideological score, derived 
from positions on legislative proposals held by appointing presidents and 
home-state senators of the same political party.45 In the never-ending 
search for better metrics of judicial ideology, scholars recently have devel-
oped “agnostic” or “behavioral” measures of ideology for the lower 
federal courts. These measures are derived directly from the actual voting 
behavior of the judges being studied, rather than by projecting the prefer-
ences of external political actors or pronouncing decision outcomes as 
liberal or conservative.46 
As a measure of judicial ideology, the Party of Appointing President 
(Republican or Democrat) proxy is the simplest, most commonly used, most 
unambiguously reliable (for accurate coding), most frequently verified as a 
meaningful and stable influence on judges, and the most easily interpreted.47 
Admittedly, this binary measure is too crude and categorical for studies de-
signed to make comparisons of judges’ relative ideologies along a spectrum, 
and it uncomfortably imports partisan political presumptions into the judi-
cial realm.48 Nonetheless, we believe it to be valid and well tailored to this 
particular study. As explained in Section II.A of this Article, with respect to 
                                                                                                                      
 44. Donald R. Songer et al., Continuity and Change on the United States 
Courts of Appeals 103–04 (2000) (explaining that in studies of “specific linkages between 
policy preferences and decision making,” scholars long have employed partisanship as “at 
least [a] rough surrogate[] for certain policy preferences”); see also James J. Brudney, Recali-
brating Federal Judicial Independence, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 149, 162 (2003) (describing the line 
of research since the 1960s indicating “that party affiliation is a significant predictor of voting 
patterns by federal judges”) .  
 45. See infra Section I.B.3. 
 46. Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should 
We Measure It?, 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 133, 162, 176–83 (2009) (describing behavioral 
measures of ideology based on voting by individual judges in sets of cases); Corey Rayburn 
Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on 
the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1133, 1137–39 (2010) (reporting that 
author’s new ideology measure, based on mapping of patterns among judges and identifying 
voting blocs, better predicted civil rights outcomes than other measures of ideology). 
 47. See Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 167–68 (suggesting that “[t]he enduring 
popularity of this measure most likely derives from a combination of” how easy it is “both to 
observe and to interpret” and the long history of studies finding a “correlation between party 
of appointing official and judicial ideology”). 
 48. For critiques of this and other measures of ideology, many of which we offered in 
our own past work, see infra notes 156–159 and accompanying text. 
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the increasingly sharp divide on Church and State issues in American poli-
tics,49 the political party is the most pertinent political category for our 
study.50 For that reason, the parallel Party of Appointing President proxy 
variable is the right tool for this job. Moreover, we employed an alternative 
ideology measure, the Common Space Scores, in a comparison model51 that 
confirmed the robustness of the ideological association found in our study. 
For each judge casting a vote in an Establishment Clause case, appoint-
ment by a Republican president was coded as “1” and appointment by a 
Democratic president as “0.” Of the 555 judicial participations in our study, 
314 (56.6 percent) were by Republican-appointed judges and 241 (43.4 per-
cent) were by Democratic-appointed judges. 
By convention among social scientists, statistical significance is general-
ly set at the .05 level (or 95 percent probability level), which thus is the 
standard by which we declare that an observed correlation between variables 
is unlikely to be the result of mere chance.52 In our study, the Party of Ap-
pointing President variable is statistically significant at a higher level than the 
minimum standard, meaning that our confidence in the finding of association 
is also greater. By reporting that the variable for Party of Appointing President 
is statistically significant at the .001 level (or 99.9 percent probability level), 
we mean that the probability is less than 1 in 1,000 that the observed associa-
tion between this independent variable and the outcome of Establishment 
Clause decisions is a product of random variation. 
Still, as Professor Frank Cross reminds us, “[T]he reader should not 
place undue importance on a finding of statistical significance, because such 
a finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not prove 
the substantive significance of that correlation.”53 Importantly, Cross empha-
sizes that “[o]ne must also consider the magnitude of the association.”54 And 
in the case of the Party of Appointing President variable in our study, the 
effect size55 on the outcome dependent variable is substantial and indeed 
dramatic.  
                                                                                                                      
 49. See infra Section II.A.1–2. 
 50. Building on our prior work involving religious affiliation influences on federal 
judges, we plan to conduct a particularized study in the near future on the interaction between 
party and religious affiliation, such as whether Catholic or Jewish judges appointed by Repub-
lican presidents respond differently to Establishment Clause claims than those of other 
religions appointed by Republican presidents or those of the same religion appointed by Dem-
ocratic presidents. 
 51. See infra Section I.B.3. 
 52. Alan Agresti & Barbara Finlay, Statistical Methods for the Social Sci-
ences 154 (4th ed., 2009) (explaining that social scientists generally “do not regard the 
evidence against [the null hypothesis] as strong unless P is very small, say, P < .05 or P < 
.01”). 
 53. Cross, supra note 24, at 4. 
 54. Id. 
 55.  By “effect size,” we mean a particular “measure of the strength of association be-
tween two variables.” See Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex 
Offenders, 44 CONN. L. REV. 161, 184 (2011).  
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As shown in Figure 1, holding all other independent variables constant 
at their means, the predicted probability that a Republican-appointed judge 
would vote to uphold an Establishment Clause claim was 25.4%, while the 
probability that a Democratic-appointed judge would uphold the claim was 
57.3%—a marginal difference of 31.9%. Thus, an Establishment Clause 
claimant’s likelihood of success was predicted to be 2.25 times higher be-
fore a Democratic-appointed than before a Republican-appointed judge. 
Figure 1. 
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge 
on Establishment Clause Claim, by Party of Appointing 
President (1996–2005) 
 
The vertical lines in Figure 1 represent the 95 percent confidence inter-
vals for these two predictions. By “95 percent confidence interval,” 
statisticians mean that the interval is “one within which we are 95 percent 
certain that the true variable value falls.”56 As Lee Epstein, Andrew Martin, 
and Matthew Schneider explain, “Such is the reality of the statistical world: 
We can never be certain about our best guesses (i.e., inferences) because 
they themselves are based on estimates. We can, however, report our level of 
uncertainty (e.g., a confidence interval) about those guesses.”57 
Thus, while our best estimate is that a Republican-appointed judge is 
25.4% likely to rule favorably on an Establishment Clause claim, the actu-
al probability could be as low as 19.5% or as high as 31.3%—that is, we 
are 95% confident that the true probability value falls inside this interval. 
Similarly, while we predict that a Democratic-appointed judge would up-
                                                                                                                      
 56. Robert M. Lawless et al., Empirical Methods in Law 239 (2010). 
 57. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, On the Effective 
Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1811, 1814 
(2006). 
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hold an Establishment Clause claim 57.3% of the time, the actual proba-
bility could be as low as 42.4% or as high as 72.1%. Because the 
probability that the comparative values would appear both in the higher 
end of the interval for a Republican-appointed judge and in the lower end 
of the interval for a Democratic-appointed judge is much lower than 5%, 
we are confident that the margin is higher, probably much higher, than the 
11.1% difference between the low and high ends of these two confidence 
intervals.58 
When we examined district court decisions in a separate regression run, 
the party variable just barely slipped out of statistical significance (to the 
.054 level) while the ideology-score variable dropped well outside signifi-
cance (above the .25 level). By contrast, in our separate regression run for 
court of appeals decisions, both the party and common-space score variables 
remained highly significant (at the .001 and .004 levels respectively). Thus, 
while some evidence of a partisan influence remains for federal trial judges, 
subject to the cautions raised earlier,59 our confidence in the association for 
federal appellate judges is stronger, a finding which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that appellate judges experience greater freedom of movement in 
deciding cases than do trial judges. 
When examining non-unanimous decisions by the appellate courts (with 
234 observations from 45 out of 105 appellate cases),60 the rates of success 
before Republican- and Democratic-appointed judges leaped even further 
apart. As shown in Figure 2, holding all other independent variables con-
stant at their means, the predicted probability that a Republican-appointed 
appellate judge would vote to uphold an Establishment Clause claim in a 
non-unanimous decision was a paltry 13.2%,61 while the probability that a 
Democratic-appointed appellate judge would uphold the claim was an 
overwhelming 70.5%—a margin of 57.3%.62 When judges in appellate 
decisions were divided about the right outcome, the predicted chance of 
success for an Establishment Clause claimant was more than five times 
greater before a Democratic-appointed judge than before a Republican-
appointed one. 
                                                                                                                      
 58. Looking at the raw frequencies in this study, Democratic-appointed judges upheld 
54.7% of Establishment Clause claims and Republican-appointed judges upheld 28.3%. That 
the predicted rate after regression and holding other variables constant is only somewhat high-
er (a margin of 31.9% compared to 26.4%) suggests that the party variable association with 
the outcome dependent variable is strong and not substantially affected by other variables in 
the model. 
 59. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
 60. The 234 judicial observations in the 45 non-unanimous appellate cases include not 
only those cast in three-judge panels but also the more numerous votes cast by judges deciding 
Establishment Clause cases after an en banc circuit hearing. 
 61. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republican-
appointed court of appeals judge in a non-unanimous decision ranges from 7.1% to 19.3%. On 
95% confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 62. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democratic-
appointed court of appeals judge in a non-unanimous decision ranges from 55.9% to 85.2%. 
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Figure 2. 
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge on Establishment 
Clause Claim, by Party of Appointing President (Non-Unanimous 
Appellate Decisions) (1996–2005) 
 
These findings of a partisan cast to Establishment Clause decisions in 
the lower federal courts are consistent with prior empirical studies. 
Professors C.K. Rowland and Robert Carp, in their comprehensive 1996 
study of district court judges, found a difference between Democratic- and 
Republican-appointed judges of 24% on religion cases generally.63 In our 
prior study of federal district and court of appeals judges in published 
Establishment Clause cases decided between 1986 and 1995, we also found 
the Party of Appointing President variable to be statistically significant by a 
margin, in terms of raw frequencies, of 18%.64 Looking more closely at the 
1986–1995 data, and holding other variables constant, Republican-
appointed judges during that period were predicted to rule in favor of an 
Establishment Clause claim at a rate of 34.4%, 65  while Democratic-
appointed judges were predicted to do so 53.3% of the time.66 Thus, while 
the finding of a correlation is not new, the divergence between 
Republican- and Democratic-appointed federal judges in Church and State 
cases appears to be getting wider. 
                                                                                                                      
 63. C.K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal Dis-
trict Courts 40 (1996). 
 64. Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 767. See also infra notes 256–
260, accompanying text, and Figure 8. 
 65. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republican-
appointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 26.0% to 42.7%. 
 66. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democratic-
appointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 41.1% to 65.4%. 
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2. Party of Appointing President and Appellate 
Panels (Panel Effects) 
In the past decade, empirical research into the federal courts of appeals 
has turned increasingly to the interactions among judges sitting on panels, 
typically measuring differences in decision outcomes by alternating configu-
rations of three-judge panels among judges appointed by presidents of 
different parties. The “panel effects” subfield of judicial decisionmaking 
studies got its jump-start more than a decade ago with the pioneering works 
of Professors Richard Revesz,67 Frank Cross, and Emerson Tiller.68 Both the 
Revesz study and the Cross and Tiller study found that the party-based 
composition of panels was significantly associated with variations in the 
voting behavior of circuit judges reviewing administrative agency actions. In 
a study of a larger set of federal appellate cases falling into multiple issue 
categories, Cass Sunstein and his collaborators described panel effects in 
terms of the following: (1) “ideological amplification,” when a judge sitting 
with two other judges from the same political party is more likely to vote in 
a stereotypically partisan direction, or (2) “ideological dampening,” when a 
judge from one party sitting with two judges from a different party is less 
likely to vote in an ideological direction.69 
As some scholars have reported, this field of study has become “increas-
ingly contentious” 70  as the presence, extent, nature, and operative 
characteristics of panel effects, as well as study designs and explanatory 
theories, are increasingly and sharply debated. Findings that an appellate 
judge’s vote is influenced by the other judges serving on the same panel 
have been variously attributed71 to the positive value of the information 
exchanged during collegial deliberation,72 a pragmatic aversion to preparing 
a dissent by the judge whose preferences leave him or her in the minority,73 
the threat that a judge who is from a different party than the other two panel 
members may “blow the whistle” if the majority were to depart from the 
                                                                                                                      
 67. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997). 
 68. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay, Judicial Partisanship and Obedi-
ence to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 
(1998). 
 69. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? 8–11 (2006). 
 70. Derek J. Linkous & Emerson H. Tiller, Response, Panel Effects, Whistleblowing 
Theory, and the Role of Legal Doctrine, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 83, 83 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2009/LinkousTiller.pdf. 
 71. For a summary of the competing theories put forward by scholars to explain panel 
effects, see Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: 
An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1319, 1329–38 (2009), and 
Joshua B. Fischman, Understanding Voting Behavior in Circuit Court Panels, Nw. L. 
Sch. Searle Center 2–3 (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/ 
papers/Fischman_voting_behavior.pdf. 
 72. See Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1639, 1641, 1661 (2003). 
 73. See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 32–34 (2008). 
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constraints of doctrine to indulge political preferences,74 strategic accounts 
responsive to the preferences of the Supreme Court or the full circuit,75 
and group psychology that pressures the minority judge to conform.76 
While most scholars have placed partisan configurations on three-judge 
panels at the center of such studies, scholars have begun to explore other 
characteristics, including gender77 and race.78 Moreover, Professor Joshua 
Fischman recently reexamined data sets from several studies and found 
that the variations in judge’s votes associated with appellate panels actual-
ly “result[] from colleagues’ votes rather than their characteristics”—that 
is, a judge is moved toward the votes of other judges by the norm of consen-
sus, irrespective of the presumed preferences of the other judges, whether 
based on party, gender, race, or other characteristics.79 
Because we have focused in this study on a more fully specified model 
of variables that may influence decisions of religious liberty cases in the 
lower federal courts (with the ideology variables being but one part of the 
overall study), and because we include both appellate and trial judges (as 
well as judge votes on en banc panels), we do not expect here to make a 
major contribution to the literature on panel effects. Nonetheless, so that the 
potential amplifying or dampening effects of party influences on judges 
would not be neglected, we did include rough measures of panel characteris-
tics in alternative regression runs in an attempt to tease out panel effects on 
Establishment Clause decisions. 
For every judge participating on a three-judge appellate panel, 80 
we coded for the addition of one Republican-appointed judge, two 
                                                                                                                      
 74. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 68, at 2159–61, 2171–72. 
 75. Kim, supra note 71, at 1328, 1368. 
 76. See Sunstein et al., supra note 69, at 67–69. 
 77. See, e.g., Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals: Minority Representation under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 299, 324 (2004) (“[In employment discrimination cases] male judges vote more liberally 
when one woman serves on a panel with them.”); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges 
Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L.J. 
1759, 1778 (2005) (finding that a male judge was twice as likely to rule for the plaintiff in 
sexual harassment or sex discrimination cases if a woman judge was on the panel). 
 78. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1, 4, 34–37 (2008) (finding a 20 percent higher probability that a white judge will vote 
in favor of a voting rights claim when sitting on a panel with an African-American judge). 
 79. Fischman, supra note 71, at 3–4; see also Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Prefer-
ences of Circuit Judges: A Model of “Consensus Voting”, J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1361348 
(analyzing the desire for consensus among judges and the effect on appellate panels). But see 
Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Indirect Influences of Gender on the U.S. Court of Appeals: 
Evidence from Sexual Harassment Law, Colum. U., http://www.columbia.edu/~gjw10/ 
FarhangWawroIndirectEffectsMay2010.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2012) (finding significant 
gender-based panel effects in sexual harassment cases). 
 80. In coding these variables, we included all three-judge appellate panels, including 
those that preceded an en banc rehearing and those that were the subject of dissents from de-
nial of rehearing en banc, but only the members of the original three-judge panel were coded 
for investigation of panel effects. 
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Republican-appointed judges, one Democratic-appointed judge, and two 
Democratic-appointed judges.81 By excluding district court judges (other 
than district court judges sitting by designation on a three-judge appellate 
panel),82 dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, and judges who served 
on an en banc panel but not the original three-judge panel, the number of 
judicial participations in this part of the study dropped from 555 to 287.83 Of 
the 101 three-judge panels examined in this part of the study, 78.2 percent 
had mixed compositions, and 21.8 percent were made up of three judges 
appointed by presidents of the same party. 
Although the coefficients for our panel effects variables point in the 
predicted direction—adding Democratic-appointed judges is positive for the 
Establishment Clause outcome dependent variable, while adding Republi-
can-appointed judges is negative—none of these variables achieved 
statistical significance at the .05 level or even marginal significance at the .10 
level.84 Thus, our results on this limited panel effects investigation preclude 
                                                                                                                      
 81. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of 
Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1493, 1530–32 (2008) (using variables for 
one and two additional Democratic-appointed judges as control variables for the partisan 
composition of a panel). We ran each of these four variables in separate regression runs be-
cause we found them to be overlapping and collinear. Panels on which the coded judge was 
joined by two additional Republicans (or Democrats) obviously also included one additional 
Republican (or Democrat). And if a panel included two additional Republicans, then it obvi-
ously could not include any additional Democrats (and vice versa). 
 82. In this study, we did not exclude district court judges sitting on a three-judge appel-
late panel by designation but reported the full population of judges who actually decided 
appellate cases. (District court judges did not sit on en banc appellate panels.) District court 
judges sitting by designation accounted for only 17 of the 422 overall appellate judicial votes 
in Establishment Clause cases. District court judges served on 17 of the 101 three-judge pan-
els, with 6 of those 17 being divided panels. Recent empirical work on district court judges 
sitting by designation in a large sample of appellate cases found that, in 83% of cases, “district 
court judges are no different than regular sitting court of appeals jurists when it comes to the 
influence of their fellow panelists.” Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Wendy L. Martinek, The Small 
Group Context: Designated District Court Judges in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 8 J. Empiri-
cal Legal Stud. 177, 194–95 (2011). In the 17% of the cases in which there was found to be 
a statistically significant difference, the influence of the ideology of other panel members on a 
designated district court judge was more than three times greater than on court of appeals 
judges, although the actual margin of difference was still substantively small; for example, 
when the other two panel members were highly conservative, a district court judge sitting by 
designation was predicted to be 4% more likely to cast a conservative vote, while a court of 
appeals judge sitting on a panel with similarly coded conservative judges was only 1.3% more 
likely to reach a conservative outcome. Id. at 195. 
 83. Although these observations came from 101 three-judge panels, the total number of 
judges on these panels who were coded on the merits for Establishment Clause votes came to 
287, because some judges on those panels concurred or dissented on separate grounds that did 
not resolve the merits of the claim. 
 84. In sum, the probability that there is no variation between the predicted rates of a 
positive judicial vote on an Establishment Clause claim with or without an additional Demo-
cratic- or Republican-appointed judge on a panel is greater than 5% or even 10%. To give the 
reader a sense of the size effect of the correlation, despite the lack of statistical significance, 
our best estimate is that the addition of a Democratic-appointed judge to a panel would have 
increased the predicted probability that a judge would vote in favor of the Establishment 
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any confident conclusion that judges shifted their votes toward the presumed 
preferences of other colleagues on three-judge panels. In the particular con-
text of Establishment Clause decisions, judges appear to have gone out the 
same door through which they came in, regardless of partisan mix on pan-
els. 
3. Common Space Scores (Judge Ideology) 
As an alternative measure of judicial ideology, and to further test the ro-
bustness of a political or ideological influence in Establishment Clause 
decisions in the lower federal courts, we also coded each district and court 
of appeals judge for Common Space Scores. 
Professors Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal originally developed the 
NOMINATE Common Space Score measure of ideological preferences for 
members of Congress, placing all aspects of legislative voting into the same 
ideological dimension along a liberal–conservative continuum.85  Subse-
quently, Professors Micheal Giles, Virginia Hettinger, and Todd Peppers 
adapted this measure for judges, by assigning the NOMINATE Common 
Space Score for the home-state senator to a federal judge being appointed to 
a vacancy in that state when the senator is of the same party as the president 
(thus assuming that senatorial courtesy applies) and otherwise assigning to 
the judge the score of the president.86 Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers explain 
how the scores are calculated as follows: 
Scores on this dimension are scaled from –1 for most liberal to +1 for most 
conservative. Absent senatorial courtesy the measure of senatorial prefer-
ences is assigned a value of zero [and the President’s score is substituted]. 
If senatorial courtesy is operative and there are two senators of the Presi-
dent’s party in a state, senatorial preferences are measured as the mean of 
the common space scores of the senators.87 
Political scientists have come to regard Common Space Scores as “the 
state-of-the-art measure for the preferences of US Court of Appeals judg-
                                                                                                                      
Clause claim from 27.7% to 39.4%. However, as expected because the variable is not statisti-
cally significant, the 95% confidence intervals overlap considerably, with the upper end of the 
interval for the scenario with no additional Democratic-appointed judge rising to 37.1% and 
the lower end of the interval for the scenario with an additional Democratic-appointed judge 
beginning at 28.7%. On 95% confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying 
text. 
 85. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic 
History of Roll Call Voting (1997). 
 86. Micheal Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A 
Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 Pol. Res. Q. 623 (2001); see also Fisch-
man & Law, supra note 46, at 173–76 (describing and evaluating Common Space Scores as 
measure of judicial ideology); Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 783–91 
(describing and critiquing the Common Space Score measure). 
 87. Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 86, at 631. 
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es.”88 The Common Space Score measure reflects the reality that different 
presidents of the same political party have different political preferences, as 
is also true of different home-state senators of the same party who play a 
role in judicial appointments. Moreover, Common Space Scores, which lie 
along a continuum, plainly are superior to the limited, two-sided Party of 
Appointing President variable for examining the relative ideology of judges; 
for example, one can apply the scores to identify the ideological mean on an 
appellate panel or to measure the ideological distance between a panel and 
the circuit as a whole or a superior court.89 While Common Space Scores 
have been used successfully as a reliable and valid measure, some studies 
that included ideology proxies as part of a more fully specified model of 
other judge-specific variables have found Common Space Scores to be 
largely interchangeable with the Party of Appointing President proxy that 
continues to be the convention in the legal academy.90 
Although the Common Space Score spectrum ranges from –1 (extreme-
ly liberal) to 1 (extremely conservative), real-world political actors, 
especially those elected to the presidency and the United States Senate, are 
unlikely to fall at the extremes. Likewise, given that judicial Common Space 
Scores are derived from the legislative-based scores of appointing presidents 
and home-state senators, the district and circuit judges included in our study 
do not fall across the entire spectrum. The most liberal score in our set of 
judges is –0.626; the most conservative is 0.656; and the mean is 0.067 (just 
slightly right of center). 
Figure 3 maps the judges in the Establishment Clause study by density 
at each one-tenth incremental position on the Common Space Score contin-
uum. Judges are distributed across the full range from –0.6 to 0.6. While 
there are substantial bands of judges who fall near the 0 point (the middle or 
moderate position), the largest clusters of judges fall around the –0.5 and 0.5 
marks; that is, the solidly (but not extremely) liberal and conservative point 
positions. 
                                                                                                                      
 88. Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 303, 306 
(2007). 
 89. See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An 
Empirical Study, 2012 Utah L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 23–24); Micheal W. Giles, 
Thomas Walker & Christopher Zorn, Setting a Judicial Agenda: The Decision to Grant En 
Banc Review in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 68 J. Pol. 852, 854 (2006). 
 90. Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 204; Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra 
note 8, at 788–89. But see Micheal Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Measuring 
the Preferences of Federal Judges: Alternatives to Party of the Appointing President 10 (2002) 
(working paper) (finding that the Common Space Score measure “clearly out-perform[s] sim-
ple reliance on the party of the appointing president”). 
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Figure 3. 
Density/Frequency of Ideology Common Space Scores by 
Judge (555 Judicial Observations); Liberal < 0; Conservative > 0 
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One of the major drawbacks of the Common Space Score proxy for ju-
dicial ideology is that the results are difficult to interpret and the real-world 
meaning of a particular point on the spectrum may not be intuitive for either 
the empirical scholar or the nonexpert reader.91 At the risk of misleading the 
reader into seeing our results as direct reports on the behavior of specific 
judges, we try here to put a face on the Common Space Score metric by 
gathering a few prominent federal appellate judges into broad score cohorts. 
On the conservative (or positive sign) side of the Common Space Score 
continuum, Judge (now Professor) Michael McConnell and Judge Alex 
Kozinski received scores between 0.3 and 0.4; Judges Frank Easterbrook, 
Edith Jones, and (now Justice) Samuel Alito received scores between 0.5 
and 0.6; Judge Richard Posner was scored right at the middle point, with 0. 
On the liberal (or negative sign) side, Judges Richard Arnold, José 
Cabranes, and Guido Calabresi received scores between -0.2 and –0.3; 
Judge (now Justice) Sonia Sotomayor was scored between –0.3 and –0.4; 
and Judges Diane Wood and Stephen Reinhardt received scores between 
–0.4 and –0.5. 
However, the reader should understand that the findings in our study are 
based on analyses of aggregate data and thus do not support a prediction (or 
report a past record) of how any individual judge has or will decide cases. 
                                                                                                                      
 91. Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 175 (observing that the results produced with 
Common Space Scores “are less intuitive and more difficult to interpret”). 
Sisk & Heise FTP 5_B.doc 3/27/2012 9:21 AM 
May 2012] Ideology “All the Way Down”? 1225 
Moreover, the graph presented below in Figure 4 is based on average pre-
dicted probabilities for each incremental step in the scores, while holding 
other variables constant, and is not a report of frequencies of individual 
judge voting. 
As Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers reported when they initially adapted 
the Common Space Score to judicial studies, the Common Space Score is 
highly correlated with the Party-of-Appointing-President variable (at 
.825).92 Thus, using the Common Space Scores as an alternative allows us to 
solidify our findings and verify in more than one way that ideology is corre-
lated with the dependent variable and that the magnitude of that effect is 
substantial. 
In these respects, our findings are confirmed. As with the Party-of-
Appointing-President variable, the Common Space Score ideology proxy 
was highly significant at the .001 level. Just as being appointed by a Repub-
lican president was negatively associated with a positive vote on an 
Establishment Clause claim, being scored conservative on the Common 
Space Score continuum was likewise negatively associated with a positive 
vote. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect on the dependent variable was 
quite substantial. Holding all other variables constant at their means, the 
more liberal judges under the Common Space Score measure (at –0.6) were 
predicted to uphold Establishment Clause claims at a 62.5 percent rate, 
while the more conservative judges (at 0.6) were predicted to uphold such 
claims at a 23.2 percent rate. 
In Figure 4, we generate the average predicted probabilities of a positive 
vote on an Establishment Clause claim for each Common Space Score in the 
range from –0.6 to 0.6, at increments of 0.1, while holding the other inde-
pendent variables constant. The solid darker line in the middle is the best 
estimate of the average predicted probability for that increment in the 
Common Space Score. The lighter broken lines, which appear above and 
below, are the higher and lower parameters of the 95 percent confidence 
intervals for the average predicted probability at each one-tenth increment of 
the Common Space Score continuum.93 
                                                                                                                      
 92. Giles, Hettinger & Peppers, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
 93. On 95 percent confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 4. 
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge on Establishment 
Clause Claim (1996–2005), by Common Space Score Increments; 
Liberal < 0; Conservative > 0 
   
 
4. Precedent, Case Type, and Other Variables 
Precedent Variables: We included two mandatory precedent variables, as 
measures of traditional legal influences on Establishment Clause decisions 
in the lower federal courts: (1) Agostini v. Felton,94 in which the Supreme 
Court overturned two prior precedents and approved government provision 
of remedial education services on the premises of parochial schools; and 
(2) Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,95 in which the Supreme Court upheld a 
school voucher program that included private religious schools. 
As reported in Table 1, the Agostini variable was significant in the model 
including Party of Appointing President as the ideology variable (while the 
Zelman variable was not significant in either model). Our study thereby con-
firms the continuing importance of legal factors in fully understanding 
judicial decisionmaking. In Section II.B.3 of this Article, we further discuss 
the Agostini decision, the magnitude of the effect of this precedent variable 
as evidence of the importance of law in judicial decisionmaking, and exam-
ine whether the Supreme Court’s clarification of Establishment Clause 
doctrine may constrain political judging in this area. 
                                                                                                                      
 94. 521 U.S. 203, 235–37 (1997). 
 95. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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Case-Type Variables: We included Case-Type control variables to ensure 
that any relationship discovered between other independent variables and 
the dependent variable was not an “artifact” of some correlation between 
that variable and a general factual type of case.96 The six Case-Type dummy 
variables were:97 
(1) Private Education (31 or 5.6% of observations); 
(2) Public Education—Elementary (77 or 13.9%); 
(3) Public Education—Secondary/Higher (106 or 19.1%); 
(4) Religious Meetings (in public facilities) (50 or 9%); 
(5) Religious Symbols (on public property or for public entities) 
(155 or 27.9%); and 
(6) Other (136 or 24.5%). 
If none of these Case-Type variables had proven to be significant, that 
would have suggested an error in our selection of the appropriate control 
variables. In fact, as shown in Table 1 above, four of the five Case-Type var-
iables—Private Education, Public Education-Secondary/Higher, Religious 
Meetings, and Religious Symbols included in the regression runs98—were 
statistically significant in both the Party of Appointing President and Com-
mon Space Score models. 
Because legal doctrine develops in response and by specific reference to 
factual contexts, such that the application of a legal rule or standard turns to 
a greater or lesser extent on the defined factual category into which a case 
falls, the significance of these Case-Type variables may provide some evi-
dence of the legal model at work. Nonetheless, we do not offer these 
particular findings as substantial evidence in support of the legal model of 
judging. Our Case-Type variables were defined with a greater breadth than 
would lend themselves to direct integration into most doctrinal formulas. We 
are reluctant to place much interpretive weight upon the inclusion of these 
control variables in a statistical model. 
                                                                                                                      
 96. As Donald Songer and Susan Tabrizi have explained, 
[In a study of evangelical Christian judges and rulings in death penalty, gender discrimi-
nation, and obscenity cases,] [t]he case facts employed in each model below are 
primarily viewed as control variables to insure that any associations discovered between 
religion and judicial decisions are not an artifact of some correlation between particular 
types of cases and the concentration of particular religions in regions giving rise to those 
types of cases. 
Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, Research Note, The Religious Right in Court: The 
Decision Making of Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. Pol. 507, 517 
(1999). 
 97. For a discussion of Case Type control variables and a further description of them as 
used in our prior study of Establishment Clause decisions, see Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra 
note 8, at 573–74.  
 98. The sixth Case Type dummy variable (“Other”) was omitted as the reference varia-
ble. 
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Religious Demographic Variables: Finally, we note the interesting and 
statistically significant association with the outcome variable of one of our 
study’s community demographic variables—the percentage of Catholics in 
the population of the metropolitan area in which the judge has his or her 
chambers. The correlation points in a surprising direction that, upon further 
reflection, we believe may indicate that this variable actually is an indirect 
proxy for—and further confirmation of the salience of—partisan or ideolog-
ical influences in this context. 
In addition to identifying the judge’s individual religious affiliation, we al-
so included three variables designed to measure the religious demographics of 
the community in which the judge works (by the county in which the judge 
has chambers): the percentage of Catholic adherents compared to the entire 
population (Catholic Percentage); the percentage of Jewish adherents in the 
population (Jewish Percentage); and the religious adherence rate overall that 
serves as a proxy for the general religiosity of that community (Adherence 
Rate). The source of the religious demographic data in our study is the 2000 
survey conducted by the Glenmary Research Center, Religious Congrega-
tions & Membership: 2000, which is based on reports from 149 religious 
bodies broken down by region and county.99 Given that the year 2000 falls 
directly in the middle of the period for our study (1996–2005), the 
Glenmary study offered the most contemporaneous and comprehensive 
measure of religious demographics for our purposes. As we have written 
previously, “Because judges as human actors and social beings live and 
work in a particular social milieu, the religious context or atmosphere of that 
community may influence a judge’s perception of legal claims that implicate 
religion or that involve appeals to religious adherence.”100 
As reported in Table 1 above, the Catholic Percentage variable was sig-
nificantly and positively associated with the Establishment Clause claim 
outcome dependent variable at the .01 level in the model that included Party 
of Appointing President (but fell outside of significance at the .05 level in 
the model using Common Space Scores, moving to marginal significance at 
the .07 level). Interestingly, the association is not in the direction we hy-
pothesized, which was that a higher Catholic demographic would move 
community attitudes (and the judge situated in that community) to be more 
favorable toward interactions between government and religious institutions 
(especially in government-aid cases, many of which involve government aid 
to students attending Catholic parochial schools). Accordingly, we expected 
the Catholic Percentage variable, if significant, to be correlated with a rejec-
tion of Establishment Clause claims. 
On further consideration, we realize that this may be an example of a 
confounding unmeasured variable. A confounding variable is an omitted 
variable that is correlated with the observed independent variable (here, 
                                                                                                                      
 99. Dale E. Jones et al., Glenmary Research Center, Religious Congrega-
tions & Membership in the United States 2000 (2002). 
 100. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 585. For more on including religious char-
acteristics of the community in empirical studies, including judicial decisionmaking, see id. 
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Catholic Percentage) and has an effect on the dependent variable (here, the 
outcome in Establishment Clause cases). As discussed subsequently in Sec-
tion II.A.1 of this Article, Catholics in the United States have moved from 
loyal support for the Democratic Party to political independence and even 
marginal support for the Republican Party. However, the metropolitan 
Northeast historically has been dominated by Catholicism101 (and northern 
urban areas also tend to have higher rates of Catholic adherence), which are 
precisely the areas in which the Democratic Party retains the strongest affili-
ation and electoral success. Moreover, as with most other religious 
communities, there are ideological differences among Catholics, with 
more liberal Catholics more likely to be situated in those Northeastern and 
northern urban centers.102 Thus, our attempt to measure the influence of 
Catholic demographics may indirectly have captured an unmeasured asso-
ciation with Democratic Party affiliation or support or general liberal 
ideology in metropolitan communities. Given that the Democratic Party is 
increasingly associated with a strict separationist position on Church and 
State issues, we would predict that communities with higher Democratic 
Party demographics would be correlated, if at all, with a more favorable 
attitude toward Establishment Clause challenges. 
If we are correct in this speculation, the significance of the Catholic Per-
centage variable in our study could be further confirmation of the political 
divide on Church and State matters that has permeated the judiciary and 
which is the central theme of this Article. In future stages of our ongoing 
study of religious liberty decisions, we should include a party affiliation or 
party vote variable for each county, perhaps along with regional or popula-
tion density measures, so as to control for and independently examine the 
separate influences of religious and political demographics. 
II. Why Have Political Differences Among Federal Judges 
Emerged So Powerfully in Establishment Clause Cases? 
With the first clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution direct-
ing that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”103 the role of religion in 
public life has been a subject of priority and controversy since the founding 
of the Republic. However, resolution by the courts of disputes at the inter-
section of religious activity and state action is of relatively recent vintage. 
Only a little more than sixty years ago, and more than 150 years after the 
Constitution was ratified, the Supreme Court first applied the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to action by state and local governments in 
                                                                                                                      
 101. Christopher G. Ellison, Jeffrey A. Burr & Patricia L. McCall., Religious Homogene-
ity and Metropolitan Suicide Rates, 76 Soc. Forces 273, 277–78 (1997). 
 102. See Earl Black & Merle Black, Divided America 105–07 (2007) (describing 
the traditional concentrations of liberal Catholics, among other Democratic constituencies, in 
New York City, Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh). 
 103. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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Everson v. Board of Education.104 And it has been less than half a century 
since the Supreme Court applied the Establishment Clause to remove offi-
cially sponsored prayer from public schools in Engel v. Vitale.105 
From the beginning of the modern Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, a tension has persisted between acknowledging the 
long and vital role that religion has played in the public and private lives of 
Americans and resisting an integration of religion with the mechanisms of 
government. Professor Thomas Berg describes the Supreme Court’s pio-
neering Everson decision as having “a split personality.”106 On the one hand, 
the Court drew a clear line against a “tax in any amount, large or small, [that 
would be] levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever 
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice 
religion.”107 In sweeping language, the Court said, “Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa.”108 On the other hand, the 
Everson majority did approve reimbursing parochial school children for bus 
transportation from public funds. By “extending . . . general state law bene-
fits to all its citizens,” the state would not “hamper its citizens in the free 
exercise of their own religion.”109 In offering to citizens the benefits of pub-
lic welfare legislation, the state “cannot exclude individual Catholics, 
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Pres-
byterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack 
of it.”110 
The same dichotomy of jurisprudential perspectives is manifest today. 
Nearly sixty years after Everson, a plurality of the Supreme Court described 
the Court’s long and conflicting series of decisions as “Januslike, point[ing] 
in two directions in applying the Establishment Clause. One face looks to-
ward the strong role played by religion and religious traditions throughout 
our Nation’s history. . . . The other face looks toward the principle that gov-
ernmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious 
freedom.”111 
Professor Scott Idleman summarizes the conflicting perspectives in this 
way: 
                                                                                                                      
 104. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 105. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For the background and impact of Engel and the school pray-
er decisions, see generally Thomas C. Berg, The Story of the School Prayer Decisions: Civil 
Religion Under Assault, in First Amendment Stories 193 (Richard Garnett & Andrew Kop-
pelman eds., 2012). 
 106. Thomas C. Berg, Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Parochial School Crisis and the Estab-
lishment Clause, in Law and Religion: Cases in Context 153, 155 (Leslie Griffin ed., 
2010). 
 107. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005). 
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[A key] subsurface variable in the jurisprudence of the religion clauses is 
the perceived relationship between religion and society . . . . Specifically, 
does one tend to view the presence or influence of religion, or of a particu-
lar religion, as either necessary, irrelevant, or deleterious to the proper 
functioning and prosperity of society and politics? Alternatively stated, 
does one believe—intuitively, or perhaps empirically—that religion is 
overall a positive, neutral, or negative factor in American life?112 
A. The Partisan Political Division in the United States 
on Matters of Church and State 
1. The Emergence of the “God Gap” Between Republicans 
and Democrats in National Politics 
As the Supreme Court began taking an ever more prominent role in 
drawing a constitutional line between what it regarded as valid public inter-
action with religion or religious institutions and invalid government 
entanglement with religion, a strong reaction in the political realm was inev-
itable. In 1962, when the Court invalidated prayer in public schools, Senator 
Sam Ervin of North Carolina retorted, “I should like to ask whether we 
would be far wrong in saying that in this decision the Supreme Court has 
held that God is unconstitutional and for that reason the public school must 
be segregated against Him?”113 Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, 
highways throughout the United States, especially in the South, were lined 
with “Impeach Earl Warren” billboards, a protest movement against liberal 
judicial rulings that gained momentum from the political backlash to the 
Court’s school prayer decision.114 
As often is the case with sharply contested policy questions in the Unit-
ed States, the political reaction to the presence of religious influences in 
public life eventually divided along partisan lines—although the partisan 
divide was slow to emerge. As Professors Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio 
describe it, the general consensus in American politics on traditional Judeo-
Christian values “was shattered in 1972 when the Democratic Party was 
captured by a faction whose cultural reform agenda was perceived by many 
(both inside and outside the convention) as antagonistic to traditional religious 
values.”115 Over the next three decades, those who seldom or never attended 
religious services gravitated toward the Democratic Party, while Americans 
                                                                                                                      
 112. Scott C. Idleman, The Underlying Causes of Divergent First Amendment Interpreta-
tions, 27 Miss. C. L. Rev. 67, 83 (2007). 
 113. Susan Dudley Gold, ENGEL V. VITALE: Prayer in the Schools 103 (2006). 
 114. Berg, supra note 105, at 211; see also The Times Were a Changin’: The Sixties 
Reader 221 (Irwin Unger & Debi Unger eds., 1998) (“One of the right-wing icons of the 
decade was the ubiquitous ‘Impeach Earl Warren’ billboard, sponsored by the far right John 
Birch Society and displayed across Dixie and in parts of the North.”). 
 115. Louis Bolce & Gerald De Maio, Secularists, Antifundamentalists, and the New 
Religious Divide in the American Electorate, in From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and 
Politics in the American Religious Mosaic 251, 256 (J. Matthew Wilson ed., 2007). 
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with high levels of religious participation became an increasingly central 
part of the Republican Party constituency. 
By 2007, Bolce and De Maio could report that, over the four preceding 
presidential elections, “the religious gap separating secularists and tradition-
alists was more important than other social and demographic cleavages in 
the electorate: It was much larger than the gender gap and more significant 
than any combination of income, education, marital status, age, and regional 
groupings.”116 
During most of the twentieth century, evangelical Protestants as a group 
voted Democratic, occasionally crossing party lines to support a Republican 
presidential candidate, such as when a Catholic was nominated by the Dem-
ocratic Party in 1960 and when a cultural liberal was the Democratic 
nominee in 1972.117 Beginning in the 1980s, however, committed evangeli-
cal Christians have become ever more loyal to the Republican Party.118 In 
1944, white evangelical Protestants gave Democratic President Franklin 
Roosevelt a solid majority with over 55 percent of their votes; by 2004, 
white evangelical Protestants gave Republican President George W. Bush 
more than three-quarters of their votes.119 
Catholics were a stalwart Democratic constituency for more than 
three-quarters of the last century. From a high point of 63 percent white 
Catholic affiliation with the Democratic Party in 1960 (when John F. 
Kennedy became the first and thus far only Catholic to win the White 
House), Catholic identification with the Democratic Party remained at ma-
jority or near-majority status until after 1976.120 At the end of a period of 
general decline, white Catholic support for the Democratic label fell to 30 
percent in 2004 (even as another Catholic, John Kerry, was nominated by 
that party for the presidency).121 
Looking beyond voting behavior, Professors Clem Brooks and Jeff 
Manza have found that, in recent decades, both evangelical Protestants and 
Catholics have shifted their partisan affiliation away from the Democratic 
Party and, more or less, toward the Republican Party: “Whereas evangelicals 
have deepened their relatively Republican pattern of identification, Catholics 
have moved from strong relative identification with the Democratic Party to 
a more independent orientation.”122 
                                                                                                                      
 116. Id. at 265. 
 117. Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in 
American Party Politics 43, 183–85, 192 (2001). 
 118. Id. at 186–201. 
 119. John C. Green, The Faith Factor 39 (2007). 
 120. Stephen T. Mockabee, The Political Behavior of American Catholics: Change and 
Continuity, in From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and Politics in the American Re-
ligious Mosaic, supra note 115, at 81, 83–85. 
 121. Id. at 84 tbl.4.1, 85. On the contrast between Catholic support for Kennedy in 1960 
and for Kerry in 2004, see David E. Campbell, A House Divided? What Social Science Has to 
Say about the Culture War, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 59, 65–67 (2006).  
 122. Clem Brooks & Jeff Manza, A Great Divide? Religion and Political Change in U.S. 
National Elections, 1972–2000, 45 Soc. Q. 421, 442 (2004); see also Harold W. Stanley & 
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The movement toward the Republican Party has been especially pro-
nounced for the most religiously observant Americans. “All else equal,” 
Professor William Galston writes, “the more often individuals attend church, 
the more likely they are to regard themselves as conservatives and vote Re-
publican.”123 In the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, nearly two-thirds 
(63 and 64 percent respectively) of those who attended religious services 
more than once a week, along with large majorities (57 and 58 percent) of 
those who attended once a week, voted for the Republican candidate.124 
In a recent and sophisticated survey of “religious intensity” and social 
and political views, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life found the 
following trend: “Across a variety of religious traditions, those who say that 
religion is very important in their lives, express a more certain belief in God, 
or pray or attend worship services more frequently tend to be much more 
conservative in their political outlook and more Republican in their party 
affiliation.”125 
During this same period, the Democratic Party has become the political 
home for secularists, who have become a key constituency in the party.126 
Although the point of departure may have been the 1972 Democratic Party 
Convention that nominated George McGovern, the secularist tinge among 
Democratic Party activists has only deepened in the ensuing decades. By 
1992, fewer than a third of first-time delegates to the Democratic Conven-
tion attended church regularly, fewer than a quarter of first-time delegates 
and approximately one-quarter of all Democratic delegates found religion to 
be highly salient in their lives, and more than 60% of all Democratic dele-
gates qualified as secularist in outlook.127 In the 2000 presidential election, 
those who reported either no religious affiliation or that they never attend 
religious services voted by a nearly two-thirds margin (61% of each) for the 
Democratic candidate.128 In 2004, those margins increased to 67% and 62% 
respectively.129 
                                                                                                                      
Richard G. Niemi, Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 1952–2004, 36 Presi-
dential Stud. Q. 172, 180 (2006) (“Declining Democratic partisanship among Catholics and 
regular church-goers was also matched by increasing identification with Republicans.”). 
 123. William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L. 
Rev. 307, 308 (2008); see also Andrew Kohut et al., The Diminishing Divide: Reli-
gion’s Changing Role in American Politics 4 (2000). 
 124. 2000 National Election Exit Poll Results, ABCNews.com, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
sections/politics/2000vote/general/exitpoll_hub.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012); 2004 U.S. 
President National Exit Poll Results, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/ 
pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
 125. Pew Forum on Religion & Pub. Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey 19 
(2008), available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-study-
full.pdf. 
 126. See Kohut et al., supra note 123, at 3. 
 127. Layman, supra note 117, at 107, 108 fig.3.2, 109, 124. 
 128. 2000 National Election Exit Poll Results, supra note 124.  
 129. Compare id. (2000 margins), with 2004 U.S. President National Exit Poll Results, 
supra note 124 (2004 margins). 
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To be sure, the Democratic Party and progressive political campaigns 
continue to draw the support of many persons of religious faith.130 As an 
important and longstanding example, Jews in the United States have long 
been closely identified with both the Democratic Party and a separationist 
approach to Church and State issues. Professor Stephen Feldman has de-
scribed American Jews as a “prototypical religious outgroup” that as a 
matter of principle has “strongly advocate[d] for the strict separation of 
church and state.”131 However, even among Jews, a “Devotional Divide”132 
has emerged in political affiliation, with a growing percentage of Jews who 
attend synagogue weekly voting Republican, along with an overwhelming 
proportion of the small but growing Orthodox Jewish community.133 Still, 
the political left has not yet resolved into an exclusively secularist political 
movement in the United States.134 Nonetheless, those with a secularist 
worldview, or at least those with “weak[er] religious attachments,”135 in-
creasingly have been drawn toward that side of the political spectrum. As 
Professor Geoffrey Layman concludes, the “core support” for the Democrat-
ic Party consists of “secularists, Jews, and the less committed members of 
the major religious traditions.”136 
                                                                                                                      
 130. See generally Steven H. Shiffrin, The Religious Left and Church-State 
Relations 3–4 (2009) (advocating greater engagement in American politics by religious 
progressives on expressly religious premises, while acknowledging that “the secular Left is 
believed to dominate the Democratic Party”). In a survey of political attitudes in 2010, the 
Pew Research Center identified two Democratic-leaning typologies of voters who remain 
highly religious: “New Coalition Democrats,” a majority of whom are minorities and who are 
both highly religious and financially stressed, and “Hard-Pressed Democrats,” who are blue-
collar, struggling financially, and very religious. Pew Research Center for the People & 
the Press, Beyond Red vs. Blue: Political Typology 15–16 (2011), available at 
http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Beyond-Red-vs-Blue-The-Political-Typology.pdf. 
 131. Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, 
the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 222, 238, 246 (2003); see also Michael J. 
Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 58 
(1996) (“As a small minority within an overwhelmingly Christian nation, Jews generally fa-
vored a policy of stringent separationism, rather than one of nondiscrimination against 
particular sects.”). 
 132. See David E. Campbell, supra note 121, at 64 (describing the difference in religious 
activity associated with political affiliation as the “Devotional Divide”). 
 133. See Jay Lefkowitz, The Election and the Jewish Vote, Comment., Feb. 2005, at 61, 
64 (reporting that 40% of Jews who attend synagogue weekly and 69% of Orthodox Jews 
voted for Republican George W. Bush in 2004, compared to only 18% of Jews who rarely or 
never attend synagogue). 
 134. See Galston, supra note 123, at 319; Kohut et al., supra note 123, at 74. 
 135. See Michael Hout & Claude S. Fischer, Why More Americans Have No Religious 
Preference: Politics and Generations, 67 Am. Soc. Rev. 165, 179 (2002) (suggesting in a 
study of religious preferences, not including a focus on political party affiliation, that the “re-
ligiously tinged political atmosphere not only brought some religious people out of apathy 
into politics but also pushed some moderate and liberal Americans with weak religious at-
tachments away from religion”). 
 136. Layman, supra note 117, at 107. 
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In 2008, President Obama’s campaign made concerted overtures to reli-
gious voters,137 and much was made of the fact that a majority of Catholic 
voters overall (without controlling for religious commitment) supported the 
Democratic candidate for the first time in several presidential election cy-
cles.138 However, the 2008 exit polls suggest that the so-called “God Gap” 
between the parties remained in force, if slightly diminished. A majority 
(55%) of those who attended religious services weekly or more voted for the 
Republican, while three-quarters (75%) of those with no religion and more 
than two-thirds of those who never attended religious services voted for the 
Democrat.139 And the “God Gap” certainly was evident in the 2010 midterm 
elections for the House of Representatives, with Republicans winning a sol-
id majority from Catholics, Protestants, and weekly church attendees (54%, 
59%, and 58% respectively), while more than two-thirds (68%) of those 
with no religious affiliation voted Democratic.140 
To further illustrate the difference, as shown in Figure 5 prepared by 
Bolce and De Maio, while the religious divide in partisan identification was 
only 15 percentage points in 1988, the gap in partisan affiliation between 
secularists (most of whom identify with the Democratic Party) and tradi-
tional religionists (most of whom identify with the Republican Party) grew 
to 66 percentage points in 2004.141 
                                                                                                                      
 137. See Michael Gerson, Op-Ed., Obama's New Culture War over Government’s Role, 
Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 2010, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/04/AR2010100404560.html (“As a candidate, it was a measure of 
Barack Obama’s political innovation and ambition that he set out to win religious voters, in-
cluding evangelical Christians. . . . During the campaign, Obama’s brand of progressivism was 
refreshingly free of secularism.”). 
 138. See 2008 Presidential Election National Exit Poll, CNNPolitics.com, http://www. 
cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p2 (last visited Jan 20, 2012). 
 139. Id.; see also John C. Green & Scott Clement, Much Hope, Modest Change for 
Democrats: Religion in the 2008 Presidential Election, Pew Forum on Religion & Pub. 
Life (Aug. 11, 2010), http://pewforum.org/Politics-and-Elections/Much-Hope-Modest-Change-
for-Democrats-Religion-in-the-2008-Presidential-Election.aspx (finding that “the contours of 
religion and politics were the same in 2008 as in 2004,” and that “the large gaps in the electorate 
that had developed along religious lines in earlier elections persisted in 2008”). 
 140. 2010 U.S. House of Representatives National Exit Poll, CNNPolitics.com, 
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2010/results/polls/#USH00p1 (last visited Jan. 20, 2012); 
see also Daniel Burke, Have Democrats Lost Faith in Faith-Based Outreach?, Religion 
News Stories (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.religionnews.com/index.php?/rnstext/have_ 
democrats_lost_faith_in_faith_based_outreach (reporting that the Democratic Party’s “hard-
won gains among religious voters are largely gone”). 
 141. Bolce & De Maio, supra note 115, at 264, 265 & fig.10.1. 
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Figure 5. 
The Religious Divide in Party Identification (1988–2004)142 
 
 
As Professors John Green and Laura Olson put it, “[T]he division be-
tween weekly attending White born-again Protestants and religiously 
unaffiliated voters was nearly 56 percentage points in 2004, rivaling the size 
of the electoral gap between Whites and Blacks.”143 
With particular pertinence to our study on Establishment Clause cases, 
the national platforms of the two parties confirm the sharp partisan dichot-
omy on the propriety of a vibrant religious presence in public life.144 
                                                                                                                      
 142. This chart is reprinted by permission from Bolce & De Maio, supra note 115, at 
265. Copyright 2007 by Georgetown University Press. Louis Bolce and Gerald De Maio, 
“Secularists, Antifundamentalists, and the New Religious Divide in the American Electorate.” 
In From Pews to Polling Places: Faith and Politics in the American Religious Mosaic, J. Mat-
thew Wilson, Editor, p. 265. Reprinted with permission. www.press.georgetown.edu. 
 143. Laura R. Olson & John C. Green, “Gapology” and the 2004 Presidential Vote, in 
Beyond Red State, Blue State: Electoral Gaps in the Twenty-First Century Amer-
ican Electorate 4 (Laura R. Olson & John C. Green, eds., 2008). 
 144. Some scholars fairly question the broader proposition that Americans are sharply 
and contentiously divided, arguing instead that “there is actually widespread agreement, or at 
least a fairly comfortable majority view, about religion’s place in politics.” Richard W. Gar-
nett, “Modest Expectations”?: Civic Unity, Religious Pluralism, and Conscience, 23 Const. 
Comment. 241, 257 (2006) (reviewing Noah Feldman, Divided by God (2005) and Kevin 
Seamus Hasson, The Right to Be Wrong (2005)). Professor Richard Garnett suggests,  
[M]ost people in America probably think . . . that the institutions of religion and govern-
ment should be separate, but also that religious faith remains an important part of both 
individual and social life, one that—consistent with the reality of pluralism and a com-
mitment to the rights of minorities—does and should play a role in shaping our culture 
and institutions. 
Id. Indeed, most Americans may fall into a critical mass of general consensus; although 
rather than bridging the gap between religionists and seculars, the center of gravity of the 
American population as a whole may be located closer to the pro-religion side of the spec-
trum. See Louis Bolce & Gerald De Maio, The Divisiveness Rationale and Negative Reference 
Group Associations in Church-State Controversies, in Religion, Politics, and American 
identity: New Directions, New Controversies 109 (David Gutterman & Andrew Mur-
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Although religious references appear in the platforms of both parties, words 
such as “God” and “prayer” appear regularly in Republican Party platforms,145 
while “religion” or “religious” are most likely to appear in Democratic Party 
platforms as planks calling for religious freedom around the world or oppos-
ing discrimination on multiple bases of which religion is but one.146 Since 
1972, every Republican Party platform has called for the return of prayer to 
schools and Republican platforms frequently have approved the public dis-
play of the Ten Commandments,147 while the terms “prayer” and “Ten 
Commandments” have never appeared in Democratic Party platforms during 
this period.148 With some frequency, the Republican Party platform has in-
veighed against “judicial rulings which attempt to drive faith out of the 
public arena,”149 while the Democratic Party on at least one occasion has 
                                                                                                                      
phy, eds., 2006) (“One of the reasons most Americans do not oppose organized religious 
groups’ participating in the political process is that most do not think that religion’s influence 
on political life is particularly harmful.”). In any event, the political science and sociology 
literature surveyed above confirms that most political activists in the two major parties, who 
are also those involved in making political appointments and litigating disputes, stand at 
greater distances from one another on questions of Church and State than do most Americans. 
 145. See, e.g., 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More 
Hopeful America 1 (2004), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/ 
25850.pdf; 2008 Republican Platform i, ii, 45, 54 (2008), available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/78545.pdf; Republican Party Platform of 1996, 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25848. 
 146. See, e.g., Democratic Party Platform of 1996, available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29611; Democratic Party Platform of 2000, 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612; Report of the Plat-
form Committee: Renewing America’s Promise 40, 52 (2008), available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/78283.pdf. But see Strong at Home, Respected in 
the World: The 2004 Democratic National Platform for America 2, 19, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/29613.pdf (twice referring to “one nation under 
God”). 
 147. 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful 
America, supra note 145, at 77, 82 (school prayer and Ten Commandments); 2008 Republi-
can Platform, supra note 145, at 44–45, 53 (school prayer and display of Ten 
Commandments); Republican Party Platform of 1972, available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25842 (school prayer); Republican Party 
Platform of 1976, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25843 
(school prayer); Republican Party Platform of 1980, available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844 (school prayer); Republican Party 
Platform of 1984, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
25845 (school prayer); Republican Party Platform of 1988, available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25846 (school prayer); Republican Party 
Platform of 1992, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
25847 (school prayer); Republican Party Platform of 1996, supra note 145 (school pray-
er); Republican Party Platform of 2000, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ 
index.php?pid=25849 (school prayer and Ten Commandments). 
 148. Cf. Democratic Party Platform of 1996, supra note 146 (The Platform “ap-
plaud[s] the President’s work to ensure that children are not denied private religious 
expression in school,” without mentioning prayer). 
 149. 2008 Republican Platform, supra note 145, at 53; see also 2004 Republican 
Party Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful America, supra note 145, at 77 
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expressed its approval of “church/state separation and of the Supreme Court 
decisions forbidding violations of those principles.”150 Thus, on questions of 
law and religion, the two political parties, in their official pronouncements, 
tend to fall into the two camps labeled by Professor Noah Feldman as “val-
ues evangelicals” and “legal secularists.”151 
2. The Percolation of the Partisan Divide on Church 
and State into Judicial Decisions 
The question remains: has “our torpidly over-stimulated political cul-
ture,” 152  particularly on questions of law and religion, percolated into 
judicial deliberations? As the results of our empirical study suggest,153 the 
divide appears to be deep and wide between federal court judges appointed 
by presidents of different parties in Establishment Clause cases decided be-
tween 1996 and 2005. 
Our ideology variables—Party of Appointing President and Common 
Space Scores (applied alternatively in separate regression models)—were 
highly significant at the p < .001 level. And the magnitude of the effect was 
substantial as well. Judges appointed by Democratic presidents were pre-
dicted to uphold Establishment Clause claims at a 57.3 percent rate, while 
judges appointed by Republican presidents were predicted to rule in favor of 
such claims at only a 25.4 percent rate. Thus, an Establishment Clause 
claimant was more than twice as likely to prevail before a Democratic-
appointed as compared to a Republican-appointed judge. 
This partisan gulf of 32 percentage points in Establishment Clause case 
outcomes is about three times higher than the typical 10 percent (or less) 
margin in outcomes reached by Republican-appointed compared to Demo-
cratic-appointed judges found in empirical studies of the federal courts that 
include a variety of case types, even when those cases are likely to have an 
ideological flavor and only published opinions are examined.154 As Cass 
                                                                                                                      
(“[W]e condemn judicial activists and their unwarranted and unconstitutional restrictions on 
the free exercise of religion in the public square.”). 
 150. Text of 1984 Democratic Party Platform, 40 Cong. Q. Almanac 73B–106B 
(1984), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal84-856-25733-1150986. 
 151. Feldman, supra note 21, at 7–8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 152. Marc O. DeGirolami, The Handmaid of Politics, 26 J.L. & Religion 641, 645 
(2011) (reviewing Steven H. Shriffin, The Religious Left and Church-and-State 
Relations (2009)). 
 153. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 154. See, e.g., Rowland & Carp, supra note 63, at 34 (finding a difference of 10% to 
13% between Democratic-appointed and Republican-appointed judges for all types of cases); 
Sunstein et al., supra note 69, at 8–13 (finding that Democratic-appointed federal appellate 
judges cast “stereotypically liberal” votes about 12% more of the time than Republican-
appointed judges, on “a number of controversial issues that seem especially likely to reveal 
divisions”); Ronald Stidham, Robert A. Carp & Donald R. Songer, The Voting Behavior of 
President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 Judicature 16, 19–20 (1996) (concluding that 
Clinton’s appointees have demonstrated moderate decisional tendencies and finding small 
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Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Michelle Ellman, and Andres Sawicki re-
marked on publication of their prominently reported study on ideological 
influences on federal appellate judges, even “where party differences are 
statistically significant, they are usually not huge.”155 Based on our findings 
in the context of Establishment Clause cases, however, describing the party 
differences as “huge” is certainly fair commentary. 
In our previous writings, we repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with 
“the concept of ideology as presently applied in empirical work regarding 
the courts.”156 We have critiqued the common employment of measures of 
“ideology” based on political party associations or the mainstream labeling 
of liberal and conservative, questioned the use of ideology proxies that pro-
ject on judges a mathematical construct derived from the preferences of 
outside political actors, challenged the one-dimensional plotting of ideology 
along the continuum of left to right in coding of case outcomes and judge 
attitudes, and generally bemoaned the imposition of a political dichotomy 
on to the courts in empirical models.157 In general, we have protested that  
“[t]he empirical evidence cannot justify elevating the assumed ideological 
or partisan affiliations of judges above such traditional measures of judicial 
temperament as legal experience, quality of legal reasoning, respect for oth-
er actors in the legal process, and integrity.”158 And we have hardly been 
alone in our critiques.159 
But on this occasion, the potency of the political correlation cannot be 
gainsaid. And, while we agree that Party of Appointing President is “a crude 
proxy for judicial ideology,”160 that partisan measure appears to be quite 
valid in the study of Establishment Clause decisions in the lower federal 
courts, indeed more of a surrogate than a mere proxy. 
By accepting the explanatory power of a partisan variable for judicial 
decisionmaking in this particular context, we do not mean to suggest that 
                                                                                                                      
differences in “liberal” voting rates, generally under 10% across categories of cases, for both 
district and court of appeals judges). 
 155 Sunstein et al., supra note 69, at 12. 
 156. Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal 
Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 873, 892 (2008) (reviewing Frank 
B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2007)). 
 157. See Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 784–85, 793; Sisk, supra 
note 156, at 892–93. 
 158. Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 8, at 794. 
 159. See e.g., Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies 
That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 Duke L.J. 
1895, 1918–22 (2009) (addressing the failure of empirical studies to “[m]eaningfully [d]efine 
and [m]easure ‘[i]deology’ ”); Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 137–213 (addressing the 
theoretical and methodological difficulties in defining, measuring, and analyzing ideology as 
an influence on judges, concluding that an ideology measure based on the actual behavior of 
judges in deciding cases offers advantages in several contexts of empirical study); Yung, supra 
note 46, at 1135–36 (critiquing the Party of Appointing President and Common Space Score 
ideology proxies). 
 160. Michael A. Livermore, Response, Realist Lawyers and Realistic Legalists: A Brief 
Rebuttal to Judge Posner, 59 Duke L.J. 1187, 1192 (2010). 
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federal judges in our study ruled as they did in order to toe the party line, 
align their actions with the party’s national platform, or ingratiate them-
selves with fellow partisans. 161  Republican- and Democratic-appointed 
judges presumably were not drawn toward one or the other outcome in Es-
tablishment Clause cases simply because that was the Republican or 
Democratic preference. As Joshua Fischman and David Law explain, 
“[P]roxy variables such as party of appointment should not be misinterpret-
ed as causal variables.”162 
Rather, persons with underlying attitudes and political perspectives that 
were likely to move them toward the religious accommodation side of the 
Establishment Clause divergence were also more likely to be appointed to 
the federal bench by a Republican administration. Judges who by prior 
disposition leaned toward the separationist side were more likely to be in a 
position to be regarded for a judicial appointment by a Democratic admin-
istration. When the major political parties are so sharply divided and visibly 
associated with opposing viewpoints on a question as prominent as the legit-
imate relationship between religion and the government (or public policy), 
and, crucially, when the absence of constraining legal doctrine leaves judges 
without clear guideposts in resolving Establishment Clause disputes, a 
judge’s preexisting party-correlated attitude is more likely to surface. 
Objectors understandably may interject that they personally know 
Democratic-appointed federal judges who are faithful religious observers 
and who embrace a robust role for religion in public life, or they may point 
to Republican-appointed judges who are thoroughly secular in outlook. 
Professor Raymond Wolfinger’s aphorism that “the plural of anecdote is 
data”163  may be correct in a descriptive sense. Nonetheless, the more 
reliable, cumulative information generated by larger data sets drawn from a 
wide population regularly reminds the empirical researcher that certain 
anecdotal experiences may not be representative of the whole.164 
Moreover, we acknowledge (and are gratified) that party or ideology are 
not perfect predictors. Even in this study, judges did not fall strictly into 
political patterns, and legal factors in the form of precedent continued to be 
salient. Our study cannot legitimately be adduced as evidence that any indi-
vidual judge is influenced by ideology or preexisting party-based attitudes. 
Our study should not be used to predict whether a specific judge or panel 
will vote a certain way in a particular Establishment Clause case. Nonethe-
                                                                                                                      
 161. Judge Patricia Wald similarly rejects the assumption, apparently indulged by some 
empirical scholars, “that judges intentionally act in alignment with the party from which they 
sprung.” Patricia M. Wald, Colloquy, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235, 
240 (1999).  
 162. Fischman & Law, supra note 46, at 170. 
 163. Fred Shapiro, Quotes Uncovered: What’s the Plural of Anecdote?, Freakonomics 
(Apr. 29, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2010/04/29/quotes-uncovered-
whats-the-plural-of-anecdote (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 164. See Agresti & Finlay, supra note 52, at 359 (“Sometimes you hear people give 
anecdotal evidence to attempt to disprove causal relationships . . . . An association does not 
need to be perfect, however, to be causal.”). 
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less, the aggregate data subjected to multivariate regression analysis con-
firms the powerful impact of party and ideology on federal judges as a group 
(or two groups—that is, Republican appointees and Democratic appointees) 
in this field of adjudication. 
Two other pieces of evidence from our study hint at the emergence of a 
“God Gap” inside the federal judiciary, which parallels the division already 
prevailing in national party politics: 
First, of the 555 judicial participations included in our study, 15 
participations by Republican-appointed judges and 40 participations by 
Democratic-appointed judges were by those with no religious affiliation. The 
ratio of observations with judges having no religious affiliation was nearly 
four times higher for Democratic appointees (16.6 percent) than Republican 
appointees (4.8 percent). 
Federal judges have been asked repeatedly during the appointment pro-
cess and by judicial biographers and researchers for information about their 
beliefs and affiliations. During the confirmation process, judicial nominees 
are asked to disclose membership in organizations, including churches, syn-
agogues, and other faith-based groups. Along with other researchers, we 
have reviewed biographical information and confirmation records for indica-
tions of religious affiliation, including memberships, speeches, and writings. 
Thus, a judge coded as having no religious affiliation is not simply someone 
who is private about personal beliefs but rather someone who apparently has 
not belonged to or been active with any religious organization. Although 
some of these unaffiliated judges may have personal religious or spiritual 
beliefs, the apparent absence of any involvement with an organized commu-
nity of faith may be consistent with a separationist perspective on Church 
and State matters—in other words, regarding religious beliefs as strictly 
private and personal and not appropriately adduced in the public dimension 
of human life.165 
We hasten to caution that this limited evidence by itself does not bear 
great weight. More than 80 percent of Democratic-appointed judges in the 
observations in our study reported a religious affiliation, so labeling this 
category of jurists collectively as secularist would be wildly inaccurate and, 
for many, insulting. Moreover, our independent variable for nonreligiously 
affiliated judges was not statistically significant in our regression. We cannot 
report that a greater share of religiously unaffiliated judges among Demo-
cratic appointees plays a significant role in the partisan disparity of 
outcomes in Establishment Clause cases. On the other hand, we cannot ex-
clude the possibility that, if we could look beyond denominational 
identification to worship frequency or other religious behaviors,166 judges 
                                                                                                                      
 165. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 8, at 578. 
 166. See John C. Blakeman & Christopher P. Bank, Presentation at Western Political 
Science Association Annual Meeting, The Religiosity of Federal District Judges: Preliminary 
Results from a Pilot Study of the Sixth Federal Circuit 26 (2009), available at http://www. 
allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/7/4/3/p317437_index.html (describ-
ing preliminary study of religious beliefs and behaviors of federal judges and hypothesizing 
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might display some of the same differences in devotional intensity that are 
correlated with different political outlooks among the population generally. 
Second, examining the raw frequencies of outcomes in Establishment 
Clause cases when separated by presidential cohort, we find indirect evi-
dence of a changing trend over time in the attitudes on Church and State 
issues by appointees of different presidents.167 As shown in Figure 6, judges 
appointed by President Johnson rejected Establishment Clause claims at a 
fairly high rate, not much different than that of judges appointed by Presi-
dents Nixon, Ford, and Reagan. Judges appointed by Presidents Carter and 
Clinton upheld more than a majority of such claims, with Clinton judges 
voting in favor of such claims at a rate nearly 20 percentage points higher 
than Johnson judges. Judges appointed by Republican presidents have con-
sistently turned away the substantial majority of Establishment Clause 
claims, with the rejection rate spiking up under judges appointed by Presi-
dent George W. Bush. 
Caution should be exercised in reviewing these comparative rates be-
cause during the 1996–2005 period of our study, the number of judicial 
participations by judges appointed by Presidents Johnson (13) and Nixon 
and Ford (31) and even Carter (70) is, not surprisingly, smaller than the 
number by judges appointed by Presidents Reagan (153), George H.W. 
Bush (97), and Clinton (158). Given that this study ended at the midpoint of 
the George W. Bush Administration, the number of judicial participations 
included from that cohort (33) is also small. In addition, the rates reported 
here are raw frequencies from our data, rather than predicted rates after con-
trolling for the independent effect of presidential cohorts through 
multivariate regression. 
                                                                                                                      
that “the congregational context of a district judge’s religious life [may] correlate[] with his or 
her views on the religious liberty clauses in the First Amendment”). 
 167. In our prior study of religious liberty decisions in the lower federal courts for the 
period 1986–1995, we found that judges appointed by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson were significantly more likely to be associated with a Pro-Secular Model constructed 
from both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause decisions. Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideol-
ogy, supra note 8, at 768–69. When we published that earlier study, we speculated that judges 
appointed during this era spent their formative years in the practice of law and on the federal 
bench (from the 1940s to the early 1970s) at the highwater mark of the Supreme Court’s sepa-
rationist approach to Establishment Clause cases. That Pro-Secular Model is not directly 
parallel, although it overlaps, with the Establishment Clause stage of the present study, be-
cause the Pro-Secular Model in that prior study was defined not only by favorable responses to 
Establishment Clause claims but also by negative responses to Free Exercise claims (and the 
latter constituted a much larger proportion of the decisions in the model). In any event, nota-
bly, the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson judges had been appointed by presidents of both 
parties, which is consistent with our current hypothesis that the partisan divide on Church and 
State issues did not emerge until the period in which judges were being appointed by Presi-
dents Carter and Reagan and thereafter. 
Sisk & Heise FTP 5_B.doc 3/27/2012 9:21 AM 
May 2012] Ideology “All the Way Down”? 1243 
Figure 6. 
Frequency of Positive Vote on Establishment Clause Claim by 
Presidential Cohort of Judges (1996–2005) 
 
 
In any event, we present the narrative of the partisan division between 
highly committed religious believers and more secular-leaning citizens in 
American politics not because it may be replicated in the personal religious 
behavior or religion-based perspectives of individual federal judges (alt-
hough, as noted, we do find preliminary evidence to that effect). Rather, and 
more importantly, because the division on the proper role of religion in pub-
lic life has sharpened along partisan lines over the past three decades, these 
attitudes are likely to filter into appointment of judges, which always has 
been and is increasingly part of the partisan political process. As Galston 
notes about political division generally, “A feedback loop [may emerge] 
that mutually reinforces polarized comportment up and down the political 
food-chain . . . .”168 Thus, as party leaders, grassroots party activists, and 
party-affiliated politicians mutually reinforce the party’s positions on issues 
of Church and State, these positions inevitably play a role in identifying 
nominees to the federal courts. 
As a result, a more welcoming approach to the influences of faith on 
public policy is likely to be found in Republican Party officeholders and 
among Republican presidential appointees, while a more secular worldview 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Galston, supra note 123, at 317; see also Brooks & Manza, supra note 122, at 434 
(finding that, for evangelicals, higher levels of religious participations were correlated with 
stronger support for Republican candidates). 
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will tend to prevail among Democratic Party politicians and especially 
Democratic appointees to executive offices including the Office of the White 
House Counsel and the Department of Justice. When a particular party holds 
the presidency, the political appointees making decisions about judicial 
nominations, as well as the home-state senators of the same party, are likely 
to fall into predictable partisan ways on the general subject of religion and 
public life. 
While we earnestly may hope that such partisan-correlated attitudes are 
checked by the judicial role, and that constraints of law should suppress per-
sonal preferences in most cases, the strongest of underlying attitudes are 
likely to persist, even if subdued. When we add in a legal doctrinal environ-
ment that either countenances reliance on such preferences or leaves judges 
with little or nothing else on which to draw, then those preexisting prefer-
ences may emerge and influence decisionmaking. Thus, the political gap on 
Church and State matters in the United States polity may provide a partial 
explanation for why judges appointed by presidents of the same party tend 
to lean in the same direction when addressing Establishment Clause contro-
versies. Importantly, the partisan or ideological pull on judges can affect 
judicial outcomes only if the legal doctrine (or lack thereof) leaves room for 
judges to step beyond legal parameters and rely on nonlegal values. 
For that reason, the story of political judging by lower federal court 
judges in Establishment Clause cases only begins with the saga of the pow-
erful and apparently far-reaching influence of the “God Gap” in American 
politics. The story continues as a tragic tale about the Supreme Court’s fail-
ure to articulate a consistent theory behind the Establishment Clause and 
prescribe a coherent set of legal rules or carefully bounded standards that 
constrain the discretion of judges when applying that law to the facts in new 
cases. 
B. The Intolerable Subjectivity of Establishment Clause Doctrine 
Even when a judge sincerely wishes to leave his politics at the court-
room door, if he finds no law to apply to a case, the judge still must resolve 
the dispute and so must fall back on some nonlegal measure or extralegal 
thesis by which to decide the case.169 If the subject is one as controversial, 
prominent, and subject to divergent opinion as the role of religion and reli-
gious influences in public life, the judge left to draw on nonlegal values will 
be hard-pressed not to trend toward his own personal views. As Justice Scal-
ia said in the context of substantive due process, but in words that apply 
with equal force to the adjudication of claims under the Establishment 
Clause, judges are unlikely to be constrained from political judging by “a 
                                                                                                                      
 169. Cf. Michael Boudin, Response, A Response to Professor Ramseyer, Predicting 
Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences, 58 Duke L.J. 1687, 1688 (2009) (“Policy 
often matters in deciding cases, but it is usually policy attributable to Congress or to public 
policy reflected in case law, common sense, and the values of the community. [So w]here 
exactly should judges look when existing law stops short?”). 
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variety of vague ethico-political First Principles whose combined conclusion 
can be found to point in any direction the judges favor.”170 
Some scholars defend balancing tests and multifactor analytical ap-
proaches in constitutional adjudication as preserving the “judgment” 
element of the judge’s work, while insisting that such analytical methods are 
properly characterized as law and may be applied in a manner distinct from 
political value choices. For example, Professor Todd Pettys recently chal-
lenged what he calls “the legitimacy dichotomy’s insistence that judges 
either apply the clearly expressed will of the sovereign people or commit the 
cardinal sin of judging by deciding cases based upon their own personal 
preferences.”171 Instead, he maintains, judicial discretion in constitutional 
cases “leaves judges with significant room to construct conflicting lines of 
argument and still honorably claim that they each are doing ‘law,’ devoid of 
reliance upon personal, non-legal premises.”172 
At least in the Establishment Clause field, the empirical evidence may 
suggest otherwise. Whatever judges may tell themselves when exercising 
that broad range of judicial “discretion” left open by ill-defined constitu-
tional doctrine and how ever they may describe the nature of their reasoning 
in official opinions, the collective bottom line in Establishment Clause cases 
correlates too strongly with personal preferences and political leanings for 
any contrary pretense. When “significant room” is opened for judicial dis-
cretion, at least in such a highly contested and politically prominent area of 
constitutional law as Church and State, judges are likely to end up “rel[ying] 
upon personal, non-legal premises.”173 We are skeptical that allotting capa-
cious discretion to judges in resolving such constitutional controversies will, 
as Pettys assures us, still “honor the public’s instinctive distinction between 
law and politics.”174 Instead, by conferring a wide ambit for judicial discre-
tion in controversial Establishment Clause cases, the Supreme Court offers 
judges the constant temptation to engage in that “cardinal sin” of deciding 
cases by personal preferences and ideological leanings. 
Addressing judicial interpretation of statutory language, Professor Law-
rence Solan recently spoke to the concerns of those who prefer “a crisp rule 
                                                                                                                      
 170. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(addressing whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms should be incorpo-
rated against the states through substantive due process). But see Ronald Dworkin, Law’s 
Empire 256 (1986) (saying that judges’ “own moral and political convictions” must be “di-
rectly engaged” to determine “what the law of their community, properly understood, really 
is”); Posner, supra note 73, at 9 (“[L]aw is shot through with politics and with much else 
besides that does not fit a legalist model of decision making.”); Richard A. Posner, Response, 
Some Realism about Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 Duke L.J. 1177, 1182 
(2010) (“[L]aw is suffused with politics (in the ideological rather than the partisan sense . . .). 
Constitutional law . . . is political in the sense of being the product not of orthodox legal mate-
rials (authoritative text plus precedents) but of the values, political in a broad (but sometimes 
in a rather narrow) sense, of the Justices.”). 
 171. Pettys, supra note 3, at 127. 
 172. Id. at 142. 
 173. Id. at 176.  
 174. Id. at 127. 
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of law conveyed in language that we can understand and comply with,” rec-
ognizing that “interpretive gaps” allow “the personal values of the individual 
judge [to] seep in to the . . . analysis.”175 In most cases of statutory interpre-
tation that reach the courts, Solan maintains that the language is sufficiently 
clear and judges are properly sensitive to the judicial role and thus “the resi-
due of unrestrained political judgment is well within tolerable limits.”176 In 
modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence, by contrast, the capacity for 
“unrestrained political judgment” appears to exceed “tolerable limits.”177 
1. The Incoherence of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence 
Professor Steven Gey remarked that the amorphous nature of Establish-
ment Clause doctrine “is best described as a nightmare for lower court 
judges trying to ascertain what analysis the Supreme Court wants them to 
apply in a particular case.”178 The lower courts have also admitted confu-
sion: 
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized there can be 
no precise Establishment Clause test capable of ready application, and 
therefore has resisted confining such sensitive analyses to “any single test 
or criterion.” . . . To the extent the Supreme Court has attempted to pre-
scribe a general analytic framework within which to evaluate 
Establishment Clause claims, its efforts have proven ineffective. Indeed, 
many believe the Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in 
“hopeless disarray,” and in need of “[s]ubstantial revision.”179 
Professor Stephen Smith reports that “[p]robably the most common adjec-
tive used in descriptions of the contemporary jurisprudence of religious 
freedom is ‘incoherent.’ ”180 
                                                                                                                      
 175. Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Statutes 3 (2010). 
 176. Id. at 5. 
 177. But see Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: 
Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1131, 1149 (2010) (“The fact that low-
er courts will reach different conclusions from each other about borderline situations [in 
Religion Clause cases] is moderately troubling, but the resulting differential treatment is not a 
major social problem, and those raising constitutional claims will certainly prefer occasional 
uncertainty to rules that render their claims totally ineffective.”). 
 178. Steven G. Gey, Religion and the State 293 (2d ed. 2006) (“[S]ome lower 
courts have simply thrown up their hands and resorted to applying several different tests in 
each case.”). 
 179. Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 550–51 (10th Cir. 
1997) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678–79 (1984); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 
573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 180. Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 
Harv. L. Rev. 1869, 1871 (2009) (reviewing Kent Greenawalt, Discourse in the Dusk 
(2008)) (quoting Stephen G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 First Amendment 
L. Rev. 1, 4 (2006)). 
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For an example of the Supreme Court’s episodic, arguably capricious, 
approach to Establishment Clause doctrine, we may look profitably to the 
Court’s announcement on the very same day in 2005 of conflicting decisions 
on public displays of the Ten Commandments. Given the largely indistin-
guishable factual circumstances behind these two cases, Professor William 
Van Alstyne comments that “[a] more vivid example of the severe doctrinal 
schism splintering the Court into factions, and even shards, would be diffi-
cult to imagine.”181 
First, in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky,182 the majority in an 
opinion by Justice Souter held that the placement of the text of the Ten 
Commandments in county courthouses was “an unmistakably religious 
statement dealing with religious obligations and with morality subject to 
religious sanction.”183 Applying the much-maligned Lemon test,184 the Court 
ruled that there was no valid secular purpose to justify the display, even with 
the post-lawsuit steps taken by the counties to supplement the display with 
other historical American documents.185 Although joining the majority opin-
ion, Justice O’Connor wrote separately to emphasize her alternative 
“endorsement” test for the Establishment Clause, concluding that the coun-
ties’ display of the Ten Commandments “conveys an unmistakable message 
of endorsement [of a set of religious beliefs] to the reasonable observer.”186 
Justice Scalia in dissent, joined by three other members of the Court at least 
in part, argued that “the Court’s oft repeated assertion that the government 
cannot favor religious practice is false” and criticized the majority’s adop-
tion of a “heightened requirement that the secular purpose ‘predominate’ 
over any purpose to advance religion.”187 
Second, in its opinion in Van Orden v. Perry,188 rendered on the same 
day as McCreary, the Court accepted a forty-year-old granite monument to 
the Ten Commandments on a state’s capitol grounds as consistent with the 
Establishment Clause.189 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion for four 
members of the Court set aside the Lemon test as “not useful” in resolving 
the case, cited the nation’s long history of official recognition of the role of 
God and religion in American life, and observed that “acknowledgments of 
the role played by the Ten Commandments in our Nation’s heritage are 
                                                                                                                      
 181. William Van Alstyne, Ten Commandments, Nine Judges, and Five Versions of One 
Amendment—The First. (“Now What?”), 14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 17, 19 n.10 (2005). 
 182. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 183. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869. 
 184. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (setting forth a balancing test for 
Establishment Clause cases that evaluates whether the government action (1) has a secular 
purpose, (2) has a primary effect that does not advance or inhibit religion, and (3) improperly 
fosters an excessive entanglement with religion). For a discussion of the Lemon test, see infra 
notes 214–216 and accompanying text. 
 185. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869–74. 
 186. Id. at 883–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 187. Id. at 885, 901 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 188. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 189. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681. 
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common throughout America.”190 Justice Scalia in concurrence echoed his 
own dissent in McCreary: 
I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation’s past and present 
practices, and that can be consistently applied—the central relevant feature 
of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring reli-
gion generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, 
or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.191 
Justice Thomas, also writing separately, called for the Court to “return to the 
original meaning of the Clause,” under which the Establishment Clause does 
not apply to or constrain the states.192 
Justice Breyer provided the fifth vote for the majority in Van Orden. He 
focused on what he saw as the “context of the display” on the capitol 
grounds and concluded that “the context suggests that the State intended the 
display’s moral message . . . to predominate” over the religious statement.193 
Explaining his shift from disapproval of a Ten Commandments display in 
McCreary to acceptance in Van Orden, Justice Breyer said that “the Court 
has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the consti-
tutional line in every case” and declared that in borderline cases there is “no 
test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.”194 
Justice Stevens, who authored the majority opinion in McCreary, was in 
the dissent in Van Orden, arguing that “[t]he message transmitted by [the 
state’s Ten Commandments] display is quite plain: This State endorses the 
divine code of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ God.”195 Justice Souter also dissented, 
declaring the following: 
 [T]he Establishment Clause requires neutrality as a general rule . . . . A 
governmental display of an obviously religious text cannot be squared with 
neutrality, except in a setting that plausibly indicates that the statement is 
not placed in view with a predominant purpose on the part of government 
either to adopt the religious message or to urge its acceptance by others.196  
Also dissenting, Justice O’Connor reiterated her concurrence in 
McCreary,197 which applied an “endorsement” test for the Establishment 
Clause.198 
Bemoaning the “unintelligibility of this Court’s precedent,” Justice 
Thomas warned in Van Orden that, “either in appearance or fact, adjudica-
                                                                                                                      
 190. Id. at 686–88. 
 191. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 192. Id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 193. Id. at 701–02 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). 
 194. Id. at 699–700. 
 195. Id. at 707 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 196. Id. at 737 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 197. Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 198. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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tion of Establishment Clause challenges turns on judicial predilections.”199 
Indeed, fifteen years earlier, Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook predicted that 
“[l]ine drawing in this area will be erratic and heavily influenced by the per-
sonal views of the judges.”200 
The empirical evidence we report in this Article suggests that Estab-
lishment Clause–case decisionmaking presents more than the mere 
appearance that personal political views influence judging. When judges 
plainly are deciding cases in a legal vacuum by inevitable resort to personal 
political presuppositions, public faith in the rule of law and the impartiality 
of the courts is undermined.201 
2. The Need for Higher Law Formality to Depoliticize 
Establishment Clause Adjudication  
Some degree of judicial discretion is inevitable and often salutary. Even 
aside from instances where the law is unavoidably or unfortunately (rather 
than intentionally) indeterminate, Professor Pauline Kim explains that “dis-
cretion may reflect certain value trade-offs as well: choosing flexibility over 
certainty by selecting a standard rather than a bright-line rule; or allocating 
certain powers to trial courts, rather than appellate courts, by establishing a 
deferential standard of review.”202 
Judges engaged in the early stages of articulating law in a novel field or 
addressing new statutory questions may need the space opened by discre-
tionary standards203  to develop better rules over time on the basis of 
experience.204 Fact-intensive questions, such as those presented to trial 
courts on both the merits and procedural questions, may best be resolved by 
ensuring that judges are able to sculpt fact-specific, circumstantial answers. 
                                                                                                                      
 199. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 697 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 200. Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1425 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dis-
senting). 
 201. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Humility, 76 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 23, 24, 46–
48 (2007) (criticizing aspects of Chief Justice Roberts’s analogy of judging to umpiring while 
acknowledging that the “analogy was brilliant because it tapped into a popular, if not domi-
nant, belief in our culture about how judges should perform”—namely, that most Americans 
“want their judges to follow the law, wherever it takes them, and not to legislate from the 
bench or substitute their personal preferences for those which are embodied in the law”); Ler-
ner & Lund, supra note 4, at 1256 (referring to “the existence of deep popular expectations 
about the distinction between law and politics”). 
 202. Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 388 (2007). 
 203. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58 (1992) (“A legal directive is ‘standard’-like 
when it tends to collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background 
principle or policy to a fact situation.”). 
 204. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988) (holding that the question of 
whether the federal government’s position in litigation lacked “substantial justif[ication]” so 
as to be liable for the prevailing party’s attorney’s fees in a case presented “a multifarious and 
novel question, little susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful generalization, and like-
ly to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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When individual rights are at stake, as in free speech or free exercise of reli-
gion cases, judges need the freedom of judgment to investigate the specific 
circumstances and analyze the strength of the claim from the bottom up, 
because applying categorical rules in such cases may effectively discrimi-
nate by mistakenly treating different cases as though they are the same.205 
Discretion persists, Kim says, “because social needs demand some measure 
of flexibility in the application of legal rules, and because institutional val-
ues argue for allocating different types of power between different levels of 
the judiciary.”206 
In contrast with adaptable case-by-case standards, “rules set a predeter-
mined condition that allows for little discretion [and thereby] generally 
provide better ex ante certainty, predictability, and fairness across cases 
. . . .”207 Recognizing that perfect determinacy in the law is seldom possible, 
rules are still more likely to provide clear guideposts to judges, prevent ad 
hoc rationalization, and limit reliance on attitudes or preferences (political, 
economic, social, or moral). 
Rather than a simple dichotomy, the terms “rules” and “standards” actu-
ally describe a continuum. For example, a standard may be defined to 
elevate certain factors, exclude other factors, or “attach such fixed weights 
to the multiple factors it considers that it resembles a rule.”208 Greater for-
mality may be achieved in a given legal doctrine not only by adoption of 
strict rules but also by fortifying the boundaries of standards, crystallizing 
the relevant factors, solidifying key elements, and articulating presumptions. 
Importantly, when devising or adjusting a rule or a standard, the judge 
should look to the direction given by the source of law that confers the pow-
er of adjudication on the judge.209 
Professor Kathleen Sullivan writes that “the real question is not whether 
the Court should exercise discretion in constitutional interpretation, but ra-
ther how much and by what means the Court should try to keep its 
discretion in check.”210 On what subjects of adjudication should judges be 
allowed more freedom of action within the wider parameters of standards 
                                                                                                                      
 205. See Sisk & Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty, supra note 8, at 56–57 (suggest-
ing that in religious free exercise cases where empirical evidence shows a disadvantage for 
Muslim claimants, “individuated analysis, while resisting categorical generalizations . . .  may 
advance more equitable and properly differentiated treatment of each religious claimant, Mus-
lim or otherwise”). 
 206. Kim, supra note 202, at 442. 
 207. Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1, 15–20 
(2011) (addressing the comparative benefits and costs of standards versus rules); see also 
Sullivan, supra note 203, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a decisionmaker 
to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts.”). 
 208. Sullivan, supra note 203, at 61. 
 209. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 
1183–84 (1989) (“[T]he extent to which one can elaborate general rules from a statutory or 
constitutional command depends considerably upon how clear and categorical one under-
stands the command to be, which in turn depends considerably upon one’s method of textual 
exegesis.”). 
 210. Sullivan, supra note 203, at 57. 
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and on what matters should judges be more tightly constrained by the pre-
scription of rules? When are standards or balancing tests211 appropriate; how 
much discretion should be allocated in such areas; which factors are legiti-
mately weighed in the balance; what comparative weights among those 
factors are most fitting; and what signals should alert the reviewing court to 
an abuse of that discretion? What positive values might be promoted by cur-
tailing discretion? And what negative effects are exacerbated by continuing 
discretion?  
Discretion may be unavoidable and even healthy in a legal system but, 
as Cass Sunstein says, “a legal system can certainly make choices about 
how much discretion it wants various people to have.”212 And Sunstein con-
tinues, “[T]he choice between rules and rulelessness [often should be made] 
on the basis of a contextual inquiry into the aggregate level of likely errors 
and abuses.”213 
In its 1971 decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman,214 the Supreme Court articu-
lated a three-part test for determining whether a government has violated the 
Establishment Clause: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.’ ”215 As Professor Michael 
Paulsen has lamented, “[T]he ambiguity of the test left the Court leeway to 
interpret each prong in various ways, producing a bewildering patchwork of 
decisions as the justices engaged in a tug-of-war over the interpretation of 
the test.”216 
In “the area of religious freedom,” Professor Thomas Berg advises that 
“balancing and case by case decisionmaking hold particular dangers.”217 As 
Berg explains, “Religion is a matter on which people, judges included, tend 
to have gut feelings that often are inarticulate but nevertheless can powerful-
ly affect their outlooks.”218  Indeed, Professor Michael McConnell once 
attributed “[m]uch of the incoherence” of the Supreme Court’s Establish-
ment Clause doctrine “to the Justices’ assumption in particular cases that 
they understand the proper relation between church and culture, and to read 
that understanding into the Constitution.”219 
                                                                                                                      
 211. See id. at 57 (explaining that balancing tests correspond to standards). 
 212. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 953, 960 (1995). 
 213. Id. at 1012. 
 214. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 215. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 
(1970)). 
 216. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 795, 801 (1993). 
 217. Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 701 
(1997). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian Examination of 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 191, 221 (1992). 
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For these reasons, as Berg says, “[c]ase by case, intuitive judgments 
about [religion clause] matters are likely to be unacceptably subjective.”220 
Other scholars also have protested that “[b]alancing tests are notoriously 
subjective”221 and, in this particular field of law, “leave[] in the judiciary far 
too much unguided discretion that was never conferred [by the text of the 
Establishment Clause].”222 
In certain areas, the benefits of more determinate rules or regulated 
standards outweigh the costs incurred by removing the freedom of move-
ment that judges enjoy under broader discretionary standards. Prescription 
of rules for judges is more likely to force extralegal factors and personal 
attitudes out of bounds. In a study of Voting Rights Act litigation in the fed-
eral courts of appeals, Professors Adam Cox and Thomas Miles found that 
“ideological divisions in judicial voting patterns are more pronounced in the 
standard-like second step [of the doctrinal sequential framework for deter-
mining unlawful vote dilution] than in the evaluation of the more rule-like 
factors [at the first stage.]”223 Accordingly, their findings “indicate that rules 
indeed may, to a greater extent than standards, limit discretion and suppress 
ideological disagreement among judges.”224 
As Kim says, where a particular legal directive in a particular field of 
law should fall on the continuum between open-ended standards and fixed 
rules “is essentially an argument about the values served or defeated by 
permitting discretion.”225 Elevating the impartiality of the judiciary and re-
ducing the influence of extralegal attitudes should, we submit, be given 
some priority among those values. When an important and visible realm of 
adjudication has become infected with political judging, the cure may well 
                                                                                                                      
 220. Berg, supra note 217, at 701. 
 221. Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill 
Rts. J. 7, 22 (2006). 
 222. Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment 
Clause Interpretation, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 489, 621–22. 
 223. Cox & Miles, supra note 81, at 1495; see also Robert C. Longstreth, Does the Two-
Prong Test For Determining Applicability of the Discretionary Function Exception Provide 
Guidance to Lower Courts Sufficient to Avoid Judicial Partisanship?, U. St. Thomas L.J. 
(forthcoming 2011) (finding no substantial difference between Republican- and Democratic-
appointed federal appellate judges in applying explicit first prong of test for discretionary 
function exception to Federal Tort Claims Act, but finding that Democratic-appointed judges 
rejected application of exception by a rate nearly three times higher than Republican-
appointed judges on the indefinite second prong). 
 224. Cox & Miles, supra note 81, at 1537; see also Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, 
Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 326, 326–27 (2007) (“[W]e mod-
el a judicial hierarchy where political control is exercised by higher courts over lower courts 
through the choice between determinate doctrines (highly specified, rule-like directives) and 
indeterminate doctrines (weakly specified, standard-like directives).”). 
 225. Kim, supra note 202, at 416. 
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require withdrawing or reducing discretion and heightening the formality of 
the governing adjudicatory regime.226 
3. Restoring the “Classic Legal Tug”227 in 
Establishment Clause Cases 
In a recent succinct essay, which speaks directly to judicial enforcement 
of the Establishment Clause, Professor Richard Garnett asks the following 
question: 
Even if “the rule of law” is not only a “law of rules,” is it troubling to think 
that resolving disputes about matters so important and basic as the place of 
religion in public life, and the connections and boundaries between reli-
gious and political authorities, depends on the deployment of imperfect, 
incomplete doctrine by judges who will not always be as learned and sen-
sible to “complex, often conflicting values” [that are identified by scholars 
as reflected in the Establishment Clause]?228 
Suggesting that “the better course is to find (somehow) some bright-line, 
on-off ‘rules’ and ‘tests,’ ”229 Garnett argues “not only that judges should be 
deferential—applying a ‘rule of clear mistake’—when evaluating legislative 
action in light of the establishment clause, but that they should settle for con-
structing and enforcing only those clear and straightforwardly administrable 
rules that are essential to vindicating the clause’s core, clear meaning and 
guarantees.”230 
In our study, we included precedent variables to explore whether the Su-
preme Court’s tightening of doctrine in the Establishment Clause field may 
                                                                                                                      
 226. Cf. Cox & Miles, supra note 81, at 1525 (finding empirical results “consistent with 
the prediction that ideological disagreements will be more intense under standards than 
rules”). 
 227. See Cross, supra note 24, at 200; see also Sisk, supra note 156, at 896 (“Empirical 
scholarship can show us where the judicial system is reasonably effective in exerting a ‘classic 
legal tug’ against personal judicial preferences or attitudes, and where it falters.”). 
 228. Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Enforcement of the Establishment Clause, 25 Const. 
Comm. 273, 274 (2008) (footnote omitted) (referring to Kent Greenawalt’s statement that “the 
[religion] clauses reflect such complex, often conflicting, values, that no tests can do them 
justice” (quoting 2 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution 52 (2008))). 
 229. Id. at 277; see also Solum, supra note 221, at 15–16, 22 (arguing that “pluralism—
religious and moral division—gives us reason to affirm an ideal of public legal reason that is 
best instantiated in the practice of legal formalism,” such that judges would “resolve cases on 
the basis of legal texts without reference to underlying values” by applying such factors as 
precedent, plain meaning, structure, original meaning, and general default rules). 
 230. Garnett, supra note 228, at 275 (footnote omitted); see also Thomas B. Griffith, 
Essay, Was Bork Right About Judges?, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 157, 165 (2011) (referring 
to “judicial humility” as “an indispensable temperament for a judge in our system”). But see 
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1840 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the Establish-
ment Clause context, we do not accord any special deference to the legislature on account of 
its generic advantages as a policymaking body, and the purpose test is not ‘satisfied so long as 
any secular purpose for the government action is apparent’ ” (quoting McCreary Cnty. v. 
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 865 n.13 (2005) (emphasis added))). 
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constrain judicial discretion and suppress political judging. By adopting 
what we believe may prove to be a new “jurisprudential regime”231 for ad-
judication of Establishment Clause challenges for government aid for 
religious persons or institutions, the Supreme Court may be shifting away 
from nondeferential and open-ended balancing and moving toward more 
rule-like guideposts in combination with deference to the political branches. 
As explained below, we find that the Court’s recalibration of Establishment 
Clause doctrine has made a measurable difference in outcomes in the lower 
federal courts but has not (yet) reduced political or ideological disparities 
among ruling judges in the lower federal courts. 
In Agostini v. Felton,232 the Supreme Court overruled two prior decisions 
and approved aid to students in religious schools when “allocated on the 
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and 
is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondis-
criminatory basis.” 233  Overturning its own prior decision in that very 
ongoing line of litigation along with a companion decision,234 the Supreme 
Court ruled that the government could offer remedial education to students 
who attend religious school by providing public schoolteachers to teach af-
ter hours in those religious school classrooms.235 No longer would school 
districts be required to take expensive and awkward steps to remove such 
public remedial instruction to off-campus sites in order to avoid supposed 
excessive entanglement with religion.236 
Professors Mark Richards and Herbert Kritzer postulate that the Su-
preme Court establishes legal directives through a “jurisprudential 
regime”—that is, “a key precedent, or a set of related precedents, that struc-
tures the way in which the Supreme Court justices evaluate key elements of 
cases in arriving at decisions in a particular legal area.”237 Professors Barry 
Friedman and Andrew Martin similarly describe “Law” in the Supreme 
Court as “serv[ing] what we might call a ‘channeling’ function rather than a 
‘constraining’ one,” in which the Court uses legal doctrine to “organize[] the 
decision of future cases.”238 Kritzer and Richards applied that concept to the 
Supreme Court’s Lemon test239 for the Establishment Clause in an empirical 
study which found that, while not dictating outcomes in a mechanical way, 
                                                                                                                      
 231. See Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme 
Court Decision Making, 96 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 305 (2002). For more on jurisprudential re-
gimes, see infra notes 237–251 and accompanying text. 
 232. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 233. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231. 
 234. The two decisions overruled were Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), and 
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). 
 235. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218–36. 
 236. Id. at 230. 
 237. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 231, at 308. 
 238. Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places: 
Some Suggestions for Modeling Legal Decision-Making, in What’s Law Got to Do with 
It? 143, 146 (Charles Geyh ed., 2011). 
 239. On the Lemon test, see supra notes 214–216 and accompanying text. 
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the Lemon regime “served to provide a framework for the decisions in Es-
tablishment Clause cases decided over the last 30 years.”240 
According to Richards and Kritzer, the “key to validating the existence 
of jurisprudential regimes is change by the Supreme Court in basic factors 
associated with decision making in a particular legal area.”241 Because our 
study is focused on the lower federal courts, we have not applied the 
Kritzer–Richards statistical methodology to verify that the Supreme Court 
itself has embraced the Agostini decision as a “jurisprudential regime 
change,” which would be revealed by shifts in the patterns of factors used or 
discounted by the Court in structuring subsequent Establishment Clause 
decisions.242 However, looking both at the definitive change articulated by 
the Court in the Agostini decision itself and the impact of that change on the 
lower federal courts as found in our study, Agostini may be a game changer 
or at least a substantial step in that direction. 
First, the Supreme Court in Agostini clearly announced a change by ex-
plicitly overruling two prior decisions as “no longer good law.”243 While the 
Court did not wholly abandon the Lemon test, the Agostini decision set nar-
rower bounds on that balancing approach by declaring that one set of factors 
no longer created a presumption of an Establishment Clause violation and 
two other factors strongly supported the validity of government interaction 
with religion or religious institutions. A plurality of the Court later described 
these changes: “In Agostini . . . we brought some clarity to our case law, by 
overruling two anomalous precedents (one in whole, the other in part) and 
by consolidating some of our previously disparate considerations under a 
revised test.”244 
In Agostini, the Court rejected prior presumptions that (1) placing public 
employees on parochial school grounds has the impermissible effect of ad-
vancing religion because those public employees would be “tempted to 
inculcate religion” and (2) administrative cooperation between public au-
thorities and religious schools confirmed an excessive entanglement 
between government and religion.245 Moreover, the Court articulated new 
presumptions that neutrality and equality in providing government aid 
were major steps toward avoiding constitutional infirmity. The Court em-
phasized that the government aid at issue was distributed pursuant to 
secular, nonreligious criteria and was provided on equal terms to religious 
                                                                                                                      
 240. Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Research Note, Jurisprudential Regimes 
and Supreme Court Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 
Law & Soc’y Rev. 827, 839 (2003). 
 241. Richards & Kritzer, supra note 231, at 309. 
 242. See Kritzer & Richards, supra note 240, at 833–38; Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. 
Richards, Taking and Testing Jurisprudential Regimes Seriously: A Response to Lax and Rad-
er, 72 J. Pol. 285 (2010) (explaining statistical testing for jurisprudential regime shift). 
 243. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209, 236 (1997). 
 244. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 245. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222–35; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion) 
([O]ur cases had pared somewhat the factors that could justify a finding of excessive entan-
glement.”). 
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and secular beneficiaries.246 When government aid is provided equally to 
all beneficiaries on religiously neutral terms, the Court stated that “the aid 
is less likely to have the effect of advancing religion” and thus is more 
likely to be upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge.247 In sum, 
the Court held, “our Establishment Clause law has ‘significant[ly] 
change[d]’ since” the earlier decision now overruled.248 
Many religion clause scholars suggest that the Agostini decision and its 
progeny have provided greater stability to the Supreme Court’s Establishment 
Clause doctrine, at least on questions of government aid, even if that change 
in course came late and still more ballast is needed. Professor Michael 
McConnell describes “the trajectory toward a ‘neutrality’ interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause” as having been interrupted by the two decisions that 
were overruled by Agostini, decisions that had “greatly confus[ed] the doc-
trinal picture.”249 Professor Thomas Berg cites the “unbroken string of 
decisions approving particular forms of aid since the early 1980s,” including 
Agostini’s overruling of “separationist decisions from the 1970s,” as setting 
a “trend [that] is obviously away from separation and toward a principle of 
treating religious entities equally in evaluating aid.”250 Noting the Court’s 
increasing focus on “equality as the lodestar of Establishment Clause deci-
sions involving funding questions,” Professor Paul Horwitz suggests that 
“[i]t is fair to say . . . that the caselaw in this area is more stable now than it 
has been for some time, and less controversial.”251 
Second, Agostini has produced a measurable change in the response of 
lower federal courts to Establishment Clause claims arising after 1997. In 
our model of Establishment Clause cases that includes Party of Appointing 
President as the ideology proxy variable, the Agostini precedent variable is 
statistically significant at the .05 level.252 In our alternative model with 
                                                                                                                      
 246. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231. 
 247. See id.; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 810, 813 (plurality opinion) (describing the 
“principles of neutrality and private choice” as the two “primary criteri[a]” for determining the 
validity of government aid against an Establishment Clause challenge). 
 248. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 237. 
 249. Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus 
on the Line between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 Pepp. L. Rev. 681, 
689 (2001). 
 250. Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern Church-State Relations, 43 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1009, 1023 n.95 (2002). 
 251. Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion, and the Constitution xv 
n.22 (2011). 
 252. We also included a precedent variable for the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648, 653 (2002), which upheld as “neutral” a 
school voucher program that allowed poor children in failing public schools to choose educa-
tional alternatives including private religious schools. The Zelman precedent variable did not 
approach statistical significance. We postulate that, while Zelman may have been the culmina-
tion of the Court’s shift to a neutrality approach for government aid in Establishment Clause 
cases, the doctrinal heavy lifting had already been accomplished in Agostini. Thus, the lower 
court judges may have already readjusted their responses to Establishment Clause claims and 
did not need to significantly recalibrate those responses after Zelman. 
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Common Space Scores as the ideology proxy, the Agostini variable slips out 
of significance but barely so (to slightly above the .06 level) as not to un-
dermine the salience of this finding. 
Holding all other independent variables constant in our Party of Appoint-
ing President model, our best estimate is that the success rate for 
Establishment Clause claimants fell from 53.0%253 to 35.8%254 with the inter-
vention of the Supreme Court’s Agostini precedent. However, we 
acknowledge that there is greater uncertainty about the magnitude of the 
size effect for the Agostini variable, given that the 95% confidence intervals 
for the two predictions do overlap.255 
Figure 7. 
Predicted Probability of Success for Establishment Clause Claims,  
Before and After AGOSTINI V. FELTON (1996–2005) 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 253. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before Agostini ranges from 
36.6% to 69.4%. On 95% confidence intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 254. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate after Agostini ranges from 
30.1% to 41.5%. 
 255. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, even among many statisticians, the overlap of 
the 95 percent confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities of success before and after 
Agostini does not mean that the Agostini variable lacks a statistically significant correlation at 
the .05 level with the outcome dependent variable in our Party-of-Appointing-President mod-
el. Even with the confidence intervals overlapping, the probability is well below 5 percent that 
the actual predicted success value before Agostini lies in the very lower bottom of that interval 
and, simultaneously, the actual predicted success value after Agostini lies in the very top of 
that interval. See Peter C. Austin & Janet E. Hux, A Brief Note on Overlapping Confidence 
Intervals, 36 J. Vascular Surgery 194, 194 (2002); see also Epstein, Martin & Schneider, 
supra note 57, at 1815 n.12 (“[W]hile the confidence intervals for these two predictions over-
lap, there is still a statistically significant difference between the predictions.”). 
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Subject to that caution, our best estimate points to a substantial margin 
of 17 percent between the rates of favorable judicial response to Establish-
ment Clause claims in the lower federal courts before and after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Agostini. That translates into nearly a one-third decline 
in the success rate for claimants. While a change in outcomes overall is 
hardly the only way to measure the impact of a new Supreme Court prece-
dent, our findings do confirm that the Court’s adjustment of doctrine has 
made a difference, even in a field of adjudication that has been notoriously 
difficult to manage. 
Unfortunately, while Agostini may have flattened the overall success rate 
for Establishment Clause claims generally, that precedent has not (yet) mut-
ed the political influences on outcomes in the lower federal courts. Indeed, 
the period following the Agostini decision has witnessed a widening of the 
gulf between Republican-appointed and Democratic-appointed judges in 
response to Establishment Clause claims. 
In Figure 8, we chart the predicted probability of a favorable ruling on 
an Establishment Clause claim by Party of Appointing President over two 
successive ten-year periods—the period of 1986–1995 (the subject of our 
prior study of religious liberty decisions) and the period of 1996–2005 (the 
subject of our present study). Because the two data sets employ somewhat 
different models (as we refined the variables for the most recent study peri-
od and included digested as well as published opinions), the comparisons 
are not exact. Moreover, we cannot readily combine the data so as to pivot 
the comparison precisely at the June 23, 1997 date of the Agostini decision, 
although we compare two equivalent ten-year time periods. For the 1986–
1995 time period, all of the judicial observations of course predate Agostini, 
while for the 1996–2005 time period, 85.6 percent of the judicial observa-
tions postdate Agostini, thus allowing us to roughly capture trends before 
and after this landmark precedent. 
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Figure 8. 
Predicted Probability of Positive Vote by Judge on Establishment 
Clause Claim, by Party of Appointing President and by Time Period 
(1986–1995 and 1996–2005) 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 8, when holding all other independent variables 
constant, the predicted probability of a positive ruling on Establishment 
Clause claims by Republican-appointed judges fell substantially between 
the two periods, from a rate of 34.4%256 during the 1986–1995 period to a 
rate of only 25.4%257 during the 1996–2005 period. But for Democratic-
appointed judges, the predicted probability of a favorable ruling on an 
Establishment Clause claim actually increased from the pre-Agostini 
period to the primarily post-Agostini period, although only slightly from a 
rate of 53.3%258 during the 1986–1995 period to a rate of 57.3%259 during 
the 1996–2005 period.260 
                                                                                                                      
 256. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republican-
appointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 26.0% to 42.7%. On 95% confidence 
intervals, see supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.  
 257. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Republican-
appointed judge in the 1996–2005 data set ranged from 19.5% to 31.3%.  
 258. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democratic-
appointed judge in the 1986–1995 data set ranged from 41.1% to 65.4%. 
 259. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate before a Democratic-
appointed judge in the 1996–2005 data set ranged from 42.4% to 72.1%. 
 260. Nor has the political difference faded even in the particular context of education, in 
which the Agostini case arose. In a forthcoming article focused on religious liberty claims (under 
both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses) that arose in public or private elementary and 
secondary schools, we find that a Republican-appointed judge is predicted to vote in a pro-
religion direction at a rate of 59.0%, while the probability for a Democratic-appointed judge is 
30.1%—a difference of nearly two-fold. Heise & Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Deci-
sionmaking, supra note 8.  
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The diverging margin in success rates for Establishment Clause claims 
before judges appointed by presidents of the two parties spread from 18.9% 
to 31.9% between these two periods. Between 1986 and 1995, an Estab-
lishment Clause claimant had about a one-and-a-half times greater 
likelihood of prevailing before a Democratic-appointed judge than before a 
Republican-appointed one. By 1996 to 2005, that higher likelihood of suc-
cess before a Democratic-appointed as compared to a Republican-appointed 
judge had grown to two-and-a-quarter times. 
In sum, the political gulf on Establishment Clause outcomes in the lower 
federal courts is growing, despite the intended clarifying effect of Agostini. 
Some might argue that the source of that expanding gap appears to be on the 
Republican side, where a more pronounced drop in favorable responses to 
such claims has emerged between the two studied time periods, while the 
response of Democratic-appointed judges has remained more stable during 
these two time periods. But that interpretation fails to account for the expecta-
tion that Establishment Clause-claim success rates in the lower federal courts 
presumably should be falling in light of developments in Supreme Court Es-
tablishment Clause precedent, while Democratic-appointed judges instead 
have been moving in the opposite direction. On the one hand, perhaps judges 
appointed to the federal bench by more recent Republican presidents, such as 
President George W. Bush (see Figure 6), may have increasingly favorable 
attitudes toward religion in public life. On the other hand, perhaps Republican 
appointees have been more faithful in following the Supreme Court’s change 
in course on Church and State matters, reflected in cases such as Agostini, 
while Democratic appointees have been reluctant to follow suit and confer 
greater deference to the political branches on the propriety and form of pub-
lic acknowledgment of or interaction with religion (see Figure 7). Most 
likely, the answer lies somewhere in between. In any event, the Supreme 
Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine continues to afford ample room for 
political judging. 
 
* * * 
 
If, as Professor Frederick Schauer writes, “values [that] often go by the 
name of the Rule of Law” include “predictability of result, uniformity of 
treatment (treating like cases alike), and fear of granting unfettered discre-
tion to individual decision-makers even if they happen to be wearing black 
robes,”261 then Establishment Clause jurisprudence does not advance the rule 
of law. To defend the rule of law and insist that the Supreme Court develop 
doctrine in a manner that sets meaningful, and meaningfully legal, guide-
posts for future decisions, one need not subscribe to what Brian Leiter 
                                                                                                                      
 261. Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer 35 (2009). But see id. at 195 
(“[S]ome Rule of Law values are served by precise, predictable, and understandable rules, 
[while] others are served by relatively open-ended standards that will allow judges and other 
official decision-makers the discretion to do justice in the individual case.”). 
Sisk & Heise FTP 5_B.doc 3/27/2012 9:21 AM 
May 2012] Ideology “All the Way Down”? 1261 
rightly characterizes as “Vulgar Formalism,”262 or what Professors Frank 
Cross and Blake Nelson similarly describe as the “naïve legal model.”263 
By any account of a legal model—vulgar, naïve, sophisticated, or re-
fined—the Supreme Court’s collective approach to Establishment Clause 
cases fails to satisfy. By neglecting to provide sufficient direction to the 
lower federal courts, either by prescription of objective rules or articulation 
of legal standards that can be weighed and applied other than by political 
metrics, the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence adds up to 
a case of judicial malpractice. 
Conclusion 
For legal scholars such as ourselves who adhere to impartiality in judg-
ing as an aspirational ideal and view the rule of law as demanding 
something more than political policy choices made by lawyers in robes, the 
ineluctable conclusion that the outcomes of Establishment Clause cases in 
federal court are determined more by ideology than any other factor might 
be seen as a cause for despair. As long-time observers of the federal courts, 
we have maintained our confidence that federal judges sincerely and with 
substantial success strip themselves of political allegiances and ideological 
presuppositions and suffuse themselves in a legal environment.264 Given the 
results of our study, our critics are likely to see our stubborn insistence on 
the possibility of law-based, nonpolitical judging, even in the face of such 
powerful empirical evidence, as wishful thinking or further proof of our na-
ïveté. 
We acknowledge that law is not perfectly determinate in every case, that 
judicial discretion is inevitable and even healthy in appropriate circumstanc-
es and when encircled by legal boundaries, and that judges are human 
beings who bring their life experiences and general perspectives to the task. 
At the same time, we agree with Professor Brian Tamanaha that “excessive 
skepticism about judging” itself becomes deleterious: 
No one thinks that law is autonomous and judging is mechanical deduc-
tion, and rare is the informed jurist who thinks that judges are engaged in 
the single-minded pursuit of their personal preferences . . . . There is a vast 
                                                                                                                      
 262. Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?, 16 Legal 
Theory 111, 111 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing “Vulgar Formalism” 
as the “idea that judicial decision-making involves nothing more than mechanical deduction 
on the model of the syllogism” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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difference in operation and consequences between a system that instructs 
judges to “Decide what you think right” and one that instructs judges to 
“Decide in accordance with the law.” There is a vast difference between 
individual judges who decide cases in terms of the outcome they prefer, 
manipulating the legal rules to justify that outcome, and judges who strive 
to produce the legally correct decision.265 
Viewed across the larger landscape of judging in the lower federal 
courts, the empirical evidence does not direct a verdict that ideology has 
supplanted the legal model. Studies that explore large numbers of cases in a 
diverse array of subject-matter fields have not found that “any extralegal 
factor—ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction to other institu-
tions, the nature of litigants, or the makeup of appellate panels—explains 
more than a very small part of the variation in outcomes.”266 As Professor 
Frank Cross summed up from his comprehensive study of federal appellate 
judges, while ideology does sometimes correlate with judicial behavior, “the 
measured effect size for ideology is always a fairly small one.”267 
Even in our present study, which involves a politically sensitive and pub-
licly prominent field of constitutional law, party and ideology are not perfect 
predictors of outcomes in Establishment Clause cases in the lower federal 
courts.268 We stand by our previous summation: “The growing body of em-
pirical research on the lower federal courts . . . reveals that ideology 
explains only a relatively modest part of judicial behavior and emerges on 
the margins in controversial and ideologically contested cases.”269 
None of this should distract our attention from the glaring partisan di-
chotomy that has emerged in Establishment Clause cases decided in the 
lower federal courts. Indeed, as Tamanaha rightly admonishes, it is prudent 
not to exaggerate the political nature of judging precisely so that we can 
“sound a genuine alarm when judges truly are deciding in a highly political 
fashion.”270 
Unfortunately, in its Establishment Clause rulings, the Supreme Court 
has failed to clearly define its reasoning in majority opinions, revealed a 
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multiplicity of theoretical approaches in a multitude of opinions that do not 
coalesce into a single theme, fostered uncertainties about legitimate sources 
for discerning the governing legal rules, and frequently offered vague gener-
alities rather than articulating clear standards for adjudication. In this way, 
the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence invites even the 
most conscientious of judges to draw deeply on personal reactions to reli-
gious symbols and political attitudes about religious influence on public 
institutions or policies. Sadly, the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine has 
become an attractive nuisance for political judging. 
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